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ABSTRACT 
The increasing complexity of modern power systems has led to a greater 
dependence on automatic control at a l l levels of operation. Large scale 
systems of which a power system i s a prime example, i s an area i n which a 
wide gap e x i s t s between t h e o r e t i c a l mathemat ica l ly based research and 
engineering prac t ice . The research programme at Durham is directed towards 
br idging t h i s gap by l i n k i n g some of the avai lable and new theoret ica l 
techniques wi th the prac t ica l requirements of on-l ine computer control in 
power systems. 
This thesis i s concerned wi th the assessment of security of power systems in 
real- t ime operation. The main object ive of t h i s work was to develop a 
package to be incorporated i n the Universi ty of Durham On l i n e Control of 
E lec t r i ca l Power Systems (OCEPS) suite t o cater f o r network is landing and 
analyse the features and the f e a s i b i l i t y of a real-t ime ' secur i ty package' 
f o r modern energy control centres. 
The real-t ime power systems simulator developed at Durham was used to tes t 
the algorithms and numerical resul ts obtained are presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The system operator has a v i t a l l y important ro le in successful bulk power 
system operations. He manages both the production and the transmission of 
e l e c t r i c i t y . His objectives include an uninterrupted supply of power, 
minimum production cost, maximum savings on interchange transactions, safety 
of f i e l d personnel, power del ivery without damage t o equipment and well 
co-ordinated maintenance. 
To accomplish these, he must have a thorough knowledge of the 
charac ter is t ics of the power system, understand economics, know how to 
e f f e c t i v e l y use computer resources, analyse c a r e f u l l y but act quickly and 
dec i s ive ly , and survive r epe t i t i ve work. His mistakes can be cost ly and 
very v i s i b l e while the pounds he saves and the in ter rupt ions he avoids go 
unnoticed. 
Power systems are becoming more t i g h t l y in tegrated, complex and the demand 
f o r e l e c t r i c i t y i s growing and as a resul t the system operator 's l i f e i s 
becoming more complicated and he i s becoming more heavily depended upon. 
System operators are not born wi th the necessary capab i l i t i e s and u n t i l now 
there have been no comprehensive college programmes to educate them. S t i l l 
much of the burden of t r a i n i n g system operators f a l l s on indiv idual control 
centres. Excellence i n t r a i n i n g i s essen t ia l . 
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The components of the operator 's i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g programme are classroom 
education ( lectures , reading, video tapes, workbooks, discussion covering 
theory, pract ica l app l i ca t ion , operating procedures, r e l i a b i l i t y standards 
e t c . ) , f i e l d t r i p s ( to hear the operator 's problems f i r s t hand), on-the-job 
t r a i n i n g (by working side by side wi th an experienced system operator) , 
f a m i l i a r i s a t i o n and practice using the control computer. The refresher 
t r a i n i n g and the upgrading of s k i l l s includes more classroom education, 
meetings wi th other control centre operators and work projects such as 
forecast ing load and generation. 
The increasing size and complexity of modern power systems has led t o a 
gradual change in control requirements. The increase i n the cost of energy 
has enhanced the need t o seek economic o p e r a t i o n s , w h i l s t the system 
complexity has taken the control task beyond the d i rec t a b i l i t i e s of the 
operators. Simple indicat ions and controls have given way to more 
sophisticated means of display and analysis , and automatic operation of 
plant and systems i s more common place. I t fo l lows that i t i s necessary to 
i n s t a l l sophist icated, yet extremely r e l i ab l e integrated control systems, 
with complex real- t ime f u n c t i o n . One benef i t of integrated simulation 
management and control software i s the a b i l i t y to provide a useful operator 
t r a i n i n g a i d , which includes power system dynamics, telemetering and energy 
management f a c i l i t i e s . Power system simulators are an important operator 
t r a i n i n g tool i n today's modern control centres. They provide pract ica l 
exerc i se w i t h h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s such as s i m u l a t i o n of emergency 
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s i tua t ions , p a r t i a l blackout and res torat ion condi t ions; i n understanding 
how one's power system q u a l i t a t i v e l y responds under abnormal frequency 
conditions including in teract ions of system frequency, governors, prime 
movers, load shedding, load res torat ion and t i e - l i n e synchronisation. In 
addi t ion the development and implementation of an integrated simulation and 
control sui te i s a pre- requis i te of any research establishment wi th in teres t 
i n the operational control aspects of generation and transmission systems, 
since i t enables the consideration of r e a l i s t i c environments. 
Energy Management Systems (EMS) are part of the integrated control system 
and t y p i c a l l y include funct ions such as Network Analysis (Topology, 
state-est imator, bus load fo recas t ) , securi ty analysis , load-f lows, security 
constrained economic despatch, interchange scheduling, system load forecast , 
despatcher t r a i n i n g s imula t ion , network reduction and automatic generation 
c o n t r o l . Some of these functions are required to run in real- t ime mode and 
some in study mode. Although due to the c o n f l i c t i n g objectives i n operating 
the system and the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of generation, load, transmission and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n f a c i l i t i e s of d i f f e r e n t systems, a standard a l loca t ion of tasks 
and re spons ib i l i t i e s to the levels of control is not p r a c t i c a l , many EMS 
systems have s imi la r s t ruc tures . 
Energy Management Systems provide means f o r the secure, economic operation 
of e l e c t r i c a l power networks and recently wi th the inc lus ion of expert 
system f a c i l i t i e s reduces the burden on systems operators. 
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The f i n a l r e spons ib i l i ty f o r the safe, secure and economic operation of the 
power system rests wi th the s t a f f i n the system control centre. Their 
capab i l i ty to carry out t h e i r control r e spons ib i l i t i e s re l i es heavily on the 
adequacy of the operation plans and guidance provided to them by planning 
s t a f f . In the event, system conditions may d i f f e r from those expected 
conditions on which the plans were based, and there is a need to review and 
revise securi ty plans in the control room environment. This i s the funct ion 
of the on-l ine security assessment package, which i s one of the functions 
car r ied out 1n a modern system control centre. 
The general object ive of security assessment i s to ensure that the power 
system is operated at the minimum cost necessary to ensure compliance wi th 
securi ty standards. 
The progression of time in the real- t ime environment means that there is 
always a danger of events overtaking the control engineer before a decision 
has been made. These two f a c t o r s , r e q u i r e t h a t the o n - l i n e s e c u r i t y 
assessment f a c i l i t y be as automatic as possible i n terms of picking up nodal 
demand productions, generator schedules and planned network conf igurat ion 
and as f a s t as possible i n producing resu l t s . 
As an aid to the network control engineer i t i s possible to assess the 
e f f e c t of any scheduled or unexpected l i n e or generator outages by means of 
a f a s t approximate load-f low method. Unfortunately, even applying the f a s t 
decoupled load flow method wi th e f f i c i e n t updating of outage solutions using 
the modified matrix technique, the solut ion time required f o r consideration 
of every possible outage may be excessive. I t i s , therefore , advantageous 
t o perform a s i m p l i f i e d ana lys i s r e f e r r e d t o as automatic contingency 
so lu t ion , which determines the subset of possible contingencies predicted to 
be most severe. 
The security assessment phase then proceeds to analyse the in tac t system and 
the preselected outage cases one at a t ime. 
Conventional techniques f o r the assessment of transmission network securi ty 
normally assume the preselected contingency l i s t w i l l not s p l i t the network 
in to is lands. Should such a s i tua t ion arise the approach i s usually to 
r e s t r i c t analysis to the largest is land so created. This approach has 
serious disadvantages i n power systems which are subjected to frequent major 
outages and f o r which islanding 1s a common occurrence. 
This d isser ta t ion represents fas t and accurate techniques f o r the 
preselection of contingency l i s t s f o r transmission l ine outages. A new 
technique f o r the diakoptic solut ion of the network f low when subjected to 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n changes i s presented. Based on the t h e o r i e s desc r ibed , 
computer programmes in Fortran language were developed f o r the real-t ime 
securi ty assessment of e l e c t r i c a l power networks and were integrated i n the 
On Line Control of E lec t r i ca l Power Systems (OCEPS) sui te at the Universi ty 
of Durham Science Laboratories. A technical paper based on new techniques 
developed f o r the securi ty analysis incorporat ing network is landing was 
published. 
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Computer assisted control of e l e c t r i c a l power transmission and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
systems represents a large scale real-t ime data processing problem and 
demands an i n t e g r a t e d approach t o so f tware design and t e s t i n g . The 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive computer hardware and the increasing 
importance of energy management has led to the wide-spread adoption of 
sophisticated control systems. Objectives of these schemes include the 
minimisation of production cost, improvement of the securi ty of supply and 
the a b i l i t y t o ensure the c o r r e c t genera t ion of power system p l a n t . 
Computer based supervisory control and data acquis i t ion systems have been 
widely used i n most power u t i l i t i e s f o r SCADA and energy management (Chapter 
1 ) . 
Chapter 2 represents a survey of approaches to the estimation of system 
securi ty and discusses power system operating states, monitoring and 
security enhancement. 
The solut ion t o l inear networks and the theory of network modificat ions i s 
described i n Chapter 3 and i s f u r the r expanded to non-linear networks i n 
Chapter 4, where the appl icat ion of the recursive branch outages technique 
to load f low i s invest igated. 
The automatic contingency selection problem is concerned wi th developing 
computer algorithms f o r quickly i d e n t i f y i n g those contingencies which may 
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cause o u t - o f - l i m i t conditions so as to reduce the number of contingencies 
that need to be evaluated when assessing the power system's securi ty i n a 
real-t ime environment. Chapter 5 presents an automatic contingency 
selection algorithm f o r the determination of a l l the contingencies that give 
e i ther voltage or l i n e f low problems when the system is subjected to single 
l ine outages. 
Power systems are subjected to frequent major outages and network s p l i t i s a 
common occurrence. Should such a s i tua t ion arise the approach i s usually to 
r e s t r i c t analysis to the largest is land so created. Theory of network 
is landing i s described i n Chapter 6. The new technique presented i s based 
on diakoptics and overcomes the above disadvantage. 
One of the requirements of today's modern power system control centres i s to 
determine equivalents f o r extensive power systems external t o an in terna l 
system equipped wi th a central control computer. These equivalents are 
needed f o r d i f f e r e n t system studies where the in ternal system is represented 
i n de ta i l and the external system is represented by t h e i r equivalent, to 
simulate the in te rac t ion e f f ec t s of the external system on the in ternal 
system f o r disturbances o r ig ina t ing i n the in ternal system. The addit ion of 
t h i s f a c i l i t y to an EMS package enhances the security assessment f u n c t i o n . 
A survey of techniques available f o r network reduction, i s presented i n 
Chapter 6 and a new approach i s discussed. 
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Chapter 7 of t h i s thesis represents the numerical resul ts obtained 
throughout t h i s work and reference i s made t o overal l EMS i n t e g r a t i o n . 
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CHAPTER 1 
REAL-TIME CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF POWER SYSTEMS 
1.1 Energy Control Centres 
The increasing size and complexity of modern power systems has led to a 
gradual change in control requirements. The increase in the cost of energy 
has enhanced the need to seek economic operations, whi ls t the system 
complexity has taken the control task beyond the direct ab i l i t i es of the 
operators. Simple indications and controls have given way to more 
sophisticated means of display and analysis , and automatic operation of 
plant and systems is more commonplace. 
E l e c t r i c i t y Authorities operate highly complex generation and 
distribution networks with an ever-increasing requirement for energy saving 
and permanency of supply. I t follows that i t i s necessary to i n s t a l l 
sophisticated, yet extremely reliable control systems to achieve these 
objectives. 
The role of system control under normal operating conditions is to 
maintain e lectr ic i ty demand and generation continuously in balance, whilst 
staying within defined levels of frequency and voltage, and whilst 
maintaining a defined degree of security against unforeseen hazards. Power 
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station plant must be controlled to cope with a variety of system 
requirements such as eff ic iency, frequency regulation, part-load operation 
and operation with frequent start-ups and shut-down (2 shift ing) and at the 
same time meet such requirements as frequency control, voltage control, real 
power demand, line-flow constraints, security against disturbances and 
economic despatch. 
To meet these needs, the operator requires a range of computing aids 
such as load-flow analysis to identify potential constraints and resolve 
them, state-estimation to identify the system configuration, data redundancy 
to enable bad data to be eliminated, economic load despatch, contingency 
analysis, VAR despatch to avoid the risk of voltage collapse. 
Electr ical power plants are interconnected and require a control point 
from which frequency and generation can be controlled, especially when 
control areas are established, and interconnection flows as well as 
generation are to be monitored, in order to control the amount of 
interchanged power with other control areas. The information is gathered 
via telemetry systems. 
For control purposes generation and transmission in England and Wales, 
managed by the CE6B, is divided into 7 Grid control areas each with i t s own 
control centre. In addition control i s co-ordinated nationally by the 
National Control Centre. Each area control centre i s responsible for 
switching of c i rcui ts within the area, and for meeting demand in the area. 
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It i s also responsible for instructing the switching of c i rcui ts between 
areas, and for optimising, as far as possible, economic operation between 
areas. 
The present method of economic operation is one in which National 
Control carries out studies 24, 12, 6, 3 and 1 hour ahead to determine which 
plant is l ikely to be in merit and required for loading. This plant i s then 
scheduled to be synchronised just before i t i s needed. The schedules for 
synchronisation are then issued by Area Control Centres to the power 
stations. 
The advent of automation, array processors, transputers and, on the 
software side, expert systems, have much to offer system control. In recent 
years the traditionally manned substation has given way in some locations to 
unmanned substations controlled by telecommand from an Area Control Room. 
I t i s l i k e l y , as nat ional ly co-ordinated despatch comes i n , that the 
economic role of Area Control Centres wil l give way to a switching control 
r o l e , in which advanced aids w i l l a s s i s t the control engineer in the 
management of the system. Training simulators can be one of enhancing 
control engineers' abi l i ty to deal with emergencies. 
The CEGB has approximately 130 power stations with a total generating 
capacity in excess of 55 GW. Figure (1.1) i l lust ra tes the location of the 
major power stations in the CEGB. The control of the power generation 
throughout the network is a hierarchical process which commences with a 
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prediction of the load demand at a Central Control Centre and ends with 
closed loop controllers which regulate the primary energy source supplied to 
the generators in response to variations in the desired and actual values of 
frequency and output power. The hierarchical levels in the control sequence 
include the long term planning of unit commitment, based on the long term 
load forecasts, the short term adjustment of the desired levels of 
generation (economic despatch) based on the short term load forecasts and 
the desired operating frequency and f inal ly the continual adjustment of the 
generator regulations by the closed loop controllers. 
The CEGB divide the unit commitment and economic despatch problems 
amongst a National Control Centre and Area Control Centres. The National 
Control Centre i s responsible for determining the overall operating levels 
throughout the network, while the Area Control Centres are responsible for 
implementing the leve ls . Figure (1.2) i l lustrates the location of the 
Control Centres in the CEGB. Figures (1.3) , (1.4) and (1.5) i l lustrate 
CEGB's Super Grid and demands. 
1.2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Data Communication 
In order to be able to meet the ever-more stringent operating 
conditions with the ever-decreasing levels of equipment redundancy, the 
operator requires up-to-date and accurate information about the state of the 
entire network. The function of supplying the operator with this 
information and additional information on the security of system derived by 
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processing the raw measurements can be provided by an on- l ine d ig i ta l 
computer. Analogue data i s scanned periodically in the order of 1 second to 
a few seconds. Each scan is triggered by the system control centre at the 
prescribed interval by issuing a request to a l l remote stations to send in 
data. 
The acquired system information together with state estimation methods 
provide indication of alarm or abnormal conditions, even with several remote 
terminations out of service. 
The major features of a SCADA software can be: 
- Alarm/event acquisition and processing 
- Telemetering 
- Telecontrol 
- Measured acquisition and processing 
The use of the special application functions such as load shedding and 
generator scheduling and control i s possible only by virtue of the 
establishment of a comprehensive supervisory control and data acquisition 
system. The use of microcomputer-based Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), 
enables and encourages the acquisition of more alarm information than was 
possible with older solid-state and electro-mechanical systems. 
Accordingly, careful attention must be paid to the processing and display of 
alarms i f the operators are to be able readily to identify the information 
during major system disturbances. The provision of several different alarm 
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categories, each with a dedicated display, and the extensive use of colour 
to rank alarms in order of importance, would resu l t in a powerful and 
comprehensive alarm processing/display fac i l i t y for control engineers. 
Operators are made aware of network event within 2-3 seconds of i t s 
occurrence. 
For telecontrols, the system can employ the common 
'check-back-before-operate' feature, or on receipt of a command telegram, 
the RTU can energise a command relay associated with the c i rcu i t breaker to 
be operated. In the la t ter , before completing the command process, the RTU 
ini t iates a current injection test to confirm that only one relay is primed 
and on ver i f icat ion, the command process is completed. This interval check 
at the RTU coupled with Digital Pulse Duration Modulation (DPDM) 
communications provides adequate security. 
Data transmission between the control centre and the substations can be 
by: Voice Frequency Telegraph (VFT) equipment operating over telephone 
cable, Power Line Carrier (PLC) and UHF radio f a c i l i t i e s . Main and standby 
channels with ful l duplex point-to-point communication (for example at 200 
baud) can be provided for each RTU where pract ica l , standby channels can be 
carried on physically separate routes. In the event of a channel fa i lure , 
channel monitoring equipment can switch communication to the alternative 
channel. 
The communications protocol commonly uses DPDM with information being 
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transmitted as a message comprising an address block, an information block 
and a data protection block. The use of DPDM and data protection blocks 
provides a communications protocol with a very high probability of error 
detection. The control centre can be provided with the fac i l i t y to request 
the message to be re-transmitted, following the detection of errors. 
The supervisory control function operates only upon specif ic operator 
request and may use the same computer interface, communication channels and 
RTUs as does the data acqu is i t ion system on a time-shared b a s i s . The 
devices being controlled are mostly c i rcui t breakers, motor operated 
disconnectors and load tap charging transformers. 
1.3 Control Systems 
The operational control of electr ical power systems can be divided into 
two major functions; simulation functions and control function. Further, as 
shown in Figures (1.6) and (1 .7) , each function comprises of a number of 
tasks executed in the manner shown in a real-time environment. Throughout 
the rest of this chapter reference is made to the Energy Management suite 
(OCEPS) developed at the University of Durham under the supervision of 
Professor M.J.H. Sterl ing. Figure (1.8) i l lustrates the execution time for 
performing different tasks. 
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1.3.1 Simulation Function 
If operators are to have confidence in and rely on the data being 
presented to them at the control centre, i t is necessary to have some means 
of verifying the displayed information. Further, to provide rel iable and 
secure operation of the network i t i s desirable to have means of checking 
operations in simulated form prior to performing network changes. 
Computer assisted control of e lectr ical power transmission and 
distribution systems represents a large scale real-time data processing 
problem and demands an integrated approach to software design and testing. 
The avai labi l i ty of relatively inexpensive computer hardware and the 
increasing importance of energy management has led to the widespread 
adoption of sophist icated control s y s t e m s . L l ^ 2 - ' Objectives of these 
schemes include the minimisation of production cost, improvement of the 
security of supply and the abi l i ty to ensure the correct operation of power 
system plant. Testing and validation of analysis and control software may 
i'3T 
be achieved with the aid of a real-time simulation system. J In this way 
the performance of energy management software can be evaluated against a 
rea l i s t i c model of the network under a range of operating conditions. A 
secondary benefit of integrated simulation, management and control software 
is the abi l i ty to provide a useful operator training aid, which includes 
power system dynamics, telemetering and energy management f a c i l i t i e s . The 
development of an Integrated simulation and control suite has been found to 
be essential in order to conduct research into operational control aspects 
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of generation and transmission systems, since i t enables the consideration 
of rea l i s t i c environments. 
F igure (1 .9) shows the major database elements and computational 
procedures required for simulation. The simulator applies to a non-linear 
a lgebraic model of the network in conjunction with a set of low order 
differential equations representing generator dynamics to produce telemetry 
information. In order to obtain stable numerical integration at speeds 
which are consistent with real-time operation, i t has been found that the 
implicit trapezoidal technique combined with sparse Newton-Raphson solution 
is very suitable. J 
1.3.2 Topology determination and State Estimation 
A pre-requisite of any power system security monitoring or control 
scheme i s a r e l i a b l e database in which the raw observations have been 
systematically processed in order to f i l t e r out the effects of uncertainty 
by inc lus ion of information on the network structure and measurement 
accuracy. Any form of f i l t e r i n g implies a loss of information and 
consequently the complete determination of the system state wil l require 
additional measurements with inherent extra cost. For example, the 2R-1 
independent variables consisting of voltage magnitudes E K (K=l,n) and angles 
Gk(k=2,n) at a l l buses, are suff icient to determine the s ta t ic state of an 
n-bus power system relative to a reference bus where e^, i s assumed to be 
zero. However these measurements are not adequate for dynamic operation in 
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the presence of measurements errors and possible fai lure of a section of the 
real-time data collection equipment. Consequently, more measurements than 
the number of unknown state variables are needed. The way in which this 
redundancy is ut i l ised gives r ise to various techniques for state estimation 
which have application in several areas of power system monitoring and 
control. 
State estimation techniques may be broadly divided into two categories, 
T 5 T 
namely s t a t i c and dynamic est imat ion. J S t a t i c methods mainly have 
application in determination of load-flow in a transmission network, 
although the system does not remain in a fixed state, the approximation of 
steady-state over a short period of time is adequate. This assumption wil l 
be valid i f the system is subject to relatively low frequency disturbances. 
Measurement redundancy is essential in this type of application. 
Dynamic state estimation on the other hand is normally associated with 
transient or dynamic s tab i l i ty problem, where the dynamics of elements of 
the system must be considered and i s typified by the integrated power plant 
problems. 
Both stat ic and dynamic estimation only operate successfully provided 
limits can be set on the s ta t is t ica l properties of transducer and telemetry 
system. Raw data could consequently f i r s t be processed to remove gross 
errors which would at least delay convergence of the estimator and, at 
worst, corrupt valid measurements. This pre-processing on raw data is known 
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as bad data suppression or data v a l i d a t i o n . The complexity of the 
algorithms incorporated in data validation software can range from simple 
limit checks on incoming analog data through to ful ly structured bad data 
suppression schemes possibly based on linearised system models.'-^-' 
In addition to the standard data validation methods of l imit checking, 
consistency checking, exponential smoothing, logical f i l t e r i n g , OCEPS suite 
includes more sophisticated algorithms based on linear programming which are 
able to eliminate the majority of bad data values at the topology 
determination s t a g e . ^ This considerably reduces the computational burden 
imposed by bad data detection and elimination during the state estimation 
process. The data validation program take ful l advantage of network and 
linear programming sparsity to achieve the necessary solution and speed. L 
I f enough well-placed measurements are available in the network, the 
state estimator problem i s well defined and the network i s sa id to be 
observable. A valid observability determination algorithm is therefore an 
important component of the estimation subsystem. 
1.3.3 Automatic Generation Control (AGC) 
The importance of AGC, also known as load frequency control, depends to 
a large extent on the size and form of a power system. 
In large density interconnected systems such as in the UK, AGC is of 
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less importance than in say the USA, where many separate companies jointly 
supply power to widely distributed consumers via a network of 
interconnections or t i e - l i n e s . The system regulation coefficient is often a 
guide to the relative importance of AGC with values ranging from in excess 
of 2000 MW/HZ for systems s imi la r to that of the UK to 200 MW/Hz more 
typical of systems in the USA and Afr ica. 
Manual load-frequency control rel ies on an operating schedule prepared 
perhaps 24 hours in advance, which indicates that the anticipated demand 
profile and the corresponding set point changes together with t i e - l ine power 
exchanges that should be maintained. The continued alteration of the set 
points needed for c lose frequency and t i e - l i n e control i s frequently 
replaced by alteration of set points at regular intervals according to the 
schedule. Further corrective action may be applied i f the frequency or 
clock error deviates from a certain band. Each alteration of the set points 
represents an appreciable step change to the set point which i t s e l f 
introduces a transient frequency disturbance before the desired result is 
achieved. In order to avoid these transients, the set points must be ramped 
between their current and desired values over a reasonable time provided 
successful manual control of both the frequency and the t ie -Hne power 
exchanges therefore necessitates operator vigilance and changes of the 
t ie - l ine exchange need special attention. 
Computer control schemes have been devised which wil l automatically 
compute and implement set point changes and also fac i l i ta te smooth 
21 
transit ion between t ie - l ine exchange requirements. J The digital 
implementation of A6C generally necessitates the sampling of the t ie - l ine 
power flows and the system frequency, together with control of the governor 
set points at approximately regular i n t e r v a l s . O p t i m a l control approach 
to AGC does not prove very advantageous in pract ice. ' - 1 1 ^ 
1.3.4 Economic Despatch (ED) 
The complex optimisation problems associated with the control of a 
power system have been the subject of considerable research. The complexity 
of the overall control problem, in which the maintenance of supply, quantity 
and quality is of more importance than economic factors, has resulted in a 
division of the research into two main areas; network control and 
operational economics. Network control, including transmission 
switching, voltage, power factor, frequency and individual plant control, 
have necessarily been of prime importance, for without re l iab i l i ty in this 
f i e l d , the consideration of operational economics is of no value. However, 
once rel iable system operation has been achieved, large financial benefits 
may be accrued from economic allocation of generation. 
For a p a r t i c u l a r load and set of network condi t ions, an optimal 
combination of generators can be determined by consideration of the 
difference in operational characterist ics of the plant. Load variation 
consequently necessitates the calculation of new optimum generation 
despatches. 
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When an accurate estimate of the load i s ava i lab le the generator 
outputs must be allocated so that a l l operational constraints are sat isf ied 
and the production cost i s minimised. The time scale of the optimisation 
permits the separate consideration of two problems, plant ordering phase 
being typical ly 4 hours in advance, plant loading or despatch phase normally 
attempted as frequently as possible, typically every 5-10 minutes. 
The simplest ED algorithm is the merit-ordering method. Only a l inear 
or piece-wise linear cost function, upper and lower generator active power 
limits and the load balance equality can be accommodated. The committed 
generators are indexed in order of increasing incremental cost, and are 
in i t i a l i sed at their lower output l imit . Generators are then considered for 
loading to t h e i r maximum l imi t in order of merit unt i l the demand i s 
sa t is f ied . The advantage of the merit order is i ts simplicity and that 
there i s no di f f icul ty in dealing with large scale problems. The 
disadvantage i s that only simple cost functions may be considered. Other 
techniques for ED are based on linear programming, quadratic programming, 
recursive quadratic programming and dynamic despatch.C12]C53C133C14]^ 
1.3.5 Unit Commitment 
Since the load varies continuously with time, the optimum combination 
of units may alter during any period. In practice however, one hour is the 
smallest time period that need be considered, as the start-up and shut-down 
time for many units i s of th is order. This plant ordering or unit 
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commitment phase of operational control thus represents a course running 
cost optimisation in which units are brought into and taken out of service 
such that the suff icient generation is always available to meet the system 
load and to provide spinning reserve. The loss of economy which can result 
from an incorrect unit commitment schedule may exceed the savings obtained 
by optimum allocation of generation among synchronised units. 
I t might at f i r s t appear that a merit-order approach is sufficient in 
which units are brought into service in accordance with their relative cost 
eff ic iency, cheaper units being scheduled before less ef f ic ient units. 
However, i f an ineff icient unit is shut-down when i t is no longer required, 
i t wil l have to be restarted several hours later prior to the next peak 
load. The saving gained by shutting down the unit is consequently offset by 
the cost of starting up the unit again. 
The main factors influencing the plant ordering decision are: 
(a) The shape of the hourly integrated consumer demand curve 
(b) The relative efficiency of each unit to be shut-down compared with that 
of the other synchronised units 
(c) The start-up and shut-down costs of each unit . 
Unit commitment based on dynamic programming considers standard 
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operation constraints for thermal units and will schedule hydro-plant in 
order to sat isfy water usage and conservation requirements. The resulting 
generation schedules ensure that hydro-plant contributes to the economic and 
i"5iri5i 
secure operation of the network.L J L J 
1.3.6 Load Forecast 
The necessity for estimating the power system load expected at some 
time in the future is apparent when i t i s remembered that generating plant 
capacity must be available to balance exactly any network load at whatever 
time i t occurs. In the long term the instal lat ion of new plant and network 
expansion is dependent upon an estimate of the future peak consumer demand 
up to several years ahead. In the short term the variation of the system 
load must be known in order that prior warning of output requirements may be 
given to power stations, enabling limitations on boiler fuel feed rates, and 
generator rate of change of output constraints, to be observed. 
Furthermore, the economic schedule for the start-up and shut-down of plant 
i s dependent on an estimate of the network load so that the cost of 
providing spinning spare capacity for system security can be minimised. 
In a power system under automatic computer control i t is this 
short-term projected load that would be used to ca lcu la te a generator 
despatch for which a l l operating limits were sat isf ied and the generator 
cost a minimum. Unfortunately, the consumer load 1s uncontrol lable , 
although small variations can be effected by frequency control and more 
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d r a s t i c a l l y by load shedding. The var ia t ion of the load does however 
exhibit certain daily and yearly pattern variations and the analysis of 
these forms the basis for several prediction t e c h n i q u e s . ^ 1 7 ^ 1 8 ^ 
The method of load prediction using spectra l expansion was f i r s t 
proposed by Farmer in 1 9 6 3 . I t has subsequently been the subject of 
several publications in which the application of the method to an automatic 
on-line load prediction and scheduling technique (implemented on the 
South-West region of the CE6B) is discussed in (5) . 
1.3.7 Emergency Rescheduling 
During emergency conditions in which insufficient generation is 
available to meet system loads or where one or more unexpected plant outages 
have occurred, i t is important to be able to rapidly reschedule generation 
and allocate the degree of load shedding required. It is vital that this 
phase of operation should be executed rapidly, and modern computer control 
systems are increasingly being used in this area. 
Under emergency conditions the economic operation of the system has a 
lower priority than the minimisation of load shedding. However, emergency 
rescheduling methods which are now avai lable, generally assign a r t i f i c i a l 
costs to each load supply point, and therefore allow a priority order of 
load shedding and also enable a trade-off between generation rescheduling 
r ig 1 
and load shedding. J 
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The rescheduling problem is mathematically similar to the economic 
despatch problem, but the difference in modelling and solution requirements, 
indicates that separate software f a c i l i t i e s are necessary. The sparse 
quadratic programming algorithm by Chan and Yip, and a second method based 
on network flow and the 'out of k i l t e r ' algorithm are commonly used. ' - 2 0 - ' 
1.3.8 Load Shedding 
Although the emergency rescheduling techniques may give an automatic 
indication of the required degree and location of load reduction, many 
applications require a more detailed analysis and further operator 
interaction before any load shedding takes place. Interactive programs have 
been developed which assign pr ior i t ies and allowable load shedding fractions 
to each consumer demand point. J Load may be reduced in a number of 
pre-defined stages and operator confirmation is necessary before any load 
shedding programs in real-time environment may be init iated either manually 
by operator selection or automatically by the detection of serious under 
frequency or load/generation imbalance conditions. 
1.3.9 Security Assessment 
With the present state of the system established through the state 
estimation program, i t i s necessary to investigate whether under present 
operating conditions, the system could withstand the outage of any l ine , 
transformer or generator without violation of the loading constraints of the 
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remaining elements. This i s the task of the contingency evaluation program. 
The contingency evaluation program accepts a l i s t of outages from either a 
fixed l i s t or from an operator entered l i s t of additional outages. 
Contingency evaluation is performed in real-time at fixed intervals or at 
operator's request. During the outage simulation, a table is compiled of 
a l l the elements that are overloaded, this information being vital in the 
derivation of the security constraints which are used in the power 
rescheduling algorithm. 
There are currently two basic approaches to the estimation of future 
system security and r e l i a b i l i t y , namely the deterministic approach and the 
probabilistic approach. The deterministic technique requires that certain 
calculations such as load-flow, unit commitment and stabi l i ty studies be 
made for a l l conceivable future contingencies. The results of these studies 
are then reviewed and a judgement i s made of whether or not some corrective 
action is required to maintain adequate system security. However, this 
technique does not take d i rec t account of the unequal probabi l i ty of 
occurrence of each system contingency, and furthermore that the number of 
ways of reaching undesirable operating s ta tes i s not constant. Thus, 
whereas the deterministic approach clearly indicates those operating 
conditions that would result in breach of system security, i t does not 
supply a consistent criterion for control action, given the results of the 
contingency tes ts . Unfortunately, probabilistic methods are not yet widely 
implemented, since the fundamental prerequisite is a detailed knowledge of a 
performance of the existing system in terms of fai lure rates, repair times, 
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and event probabil it ies. The introduction of such techniques would 
therefore normally only be feasible after a prolonged data collection and 
analysis period and consequently their implementation would not appear 
relevant as part of an in i t i a l power system control package. 
Non-linear load-flow techniques are quite time-consuming and costly, 
especially i f many cases are to be studied. The d-c load-flow approach is 
the fas tes t technique, but i t s accuracy i s low and does not provide 
information regarding reactive flow in the system elements. This technique 
has the advantage of simple data, speed of execution and reasonable storage 
requirements. I t provides the basis for the provision of an outage 
contingency l i s t , which would be later accepted by an AC security assessment 
p r o g r a n . ^ 2 " 
The basis of any on-line security assessment scheme i s an AC power flow 
solution. Each cycle of security monitoring and analysis determines the 
effects of a selected l i s t of outage contingencies on the steady-state 
operation of the system, making use of real - t ime data. The program 
ca lcu la tes busbar voltages and power f lows, using a vector of bus-bar 
injections and predicted network configuration. In general, the busbar 
injections are calculated from s ta t is t ica l data obtained on-line or state 
estimation, loading conditions and interchange schedules.£24][25][26] 
Modern security assessment packages should cope with network islanding 
which could be caused as a result of transmission l ine outages or as a 
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result of real-time topology changes in the power system. 
1.4 Discussion 
The increasing complexity of modern power systems has led to a greater 
dependence of automatic control at a l l levels of operation. The higher 
levels of control have tradit ionally relied heavily on human judgement 
especially in respect of economic factors. However, recent international 
research experience has shown that centralised computer control i s feasible 
for small sca le networks but that costs would r i s e alarmingly for the 
implementation of schemes on a national basis. The geographical 
distribution of the plant presents enormous data gathering and control 
problems which, for large scale systems, preclude any direct approach to 
centralised control. 
Despite the overall problem complexity many national supply boards are 
already instal l ing computer control systems for spec i f ic , mostly loca l , 
functions within the network. Generator start-up, shut-down and control was 
one of the f i r s t areas to be computer controlled, together with boiler and 
other plant controls. These schemes are however, usually only within a 
single power station and rely on the manual coordination of the stations to 
meet national c r i t e r i a . Their existence does however, fac i l i ta te data 
reduction and simplified control implementation for the co-ordinating 
control leve l . 
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The primary function of an electr ical power system is to provide a 
secure and reliable source of e lect r ic i ty to the consumer. E lectr ic i ty 
Authorities operate highly complex generation and distribution networks with 
an ever-increasing requirement for energy saving and permanency of supply. 
It follows that i t is necessary to insta l l sophisticated, yet extremely 
rel iable control systems to achieve these objectives. 
In order to be able to meet the ever-more stringent operating 
conditions with the ever-decreasing levels of equipment redundancy, the 
operator requires up-to-date and accurate information about the state of the 
entire network. The function of supplying the operator with this 
information and additional information on the security of system derived by 
processing the raw measurements can be provided by an on- l ine d ig i ta l 
computer. 
Throughout this chapter the main functions of a control system package 
where highlighted. OCEPS suite developed at the University of Durham, not 
only provides the basis for operator training and future research but is a 
unique example of an Energy Management System (EMS) package. The 
co-ordination of the functions mentioned in section 1.3 of this thesis is 
i l lustrated through Figures (1.10) and (1.13). 
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FIGURE 1.6 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS 
SIMULATION FUNCTION 
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FIGURE 1.7 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 1.9 SIMULATION SUBSYSTEM 
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OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF E L E C T R I C POWER SYSTEMS 
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS 
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FIGURE 1.13 GENERATION AND LOAD CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
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CHAPTER 2 
REAL-TIME SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of secur i ty can be expressed as the capab i l i t y to meet 
demand i n terms of a v a i l a b i l i t y of enough product ion and t r a n s m i s s i o n 
resources to match any load r i s e and credib le but unforecasted outages 
F28 I 
without exceeding acceptable l i m i t s in frequency and voltage drops. 
System secur i ty studies s t a r t in the long-term planning stage when the 
transmission and generation systems are designed taking into account some 
contingency s i t u a t i o n s . However, due to economic cons idera t ions , only so 
much s e c u r i t y can be b u i l t i n t o a power s y s t e m . In the s h o r t term 
simulations of the future condit ions in the network are car r ied out in order 
to assure that the transmission and generation f a c i l i t i e s scheduled to be 
operative are adequate to meet pre-estab l ished secur i ty requirements. 
However, the planner cannot predict a l l possib le system configurat ions and 
system demands. There i s then the n e c e s s i t y of p r o v i d i n g a d d i t i o n a l 
secur i ty ana lys is and control in the real - t ime environment. 
The purpose of secur i ty assessment i s to detect and a l e r t operators to 
insecure and abnormal condit ions so that cor rec t ive strategy may be planned 
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and cor rec t ive act ion taken. 
This chapter represents a survey of approaches to the estimation of 
system secur i ty and d iscusses power system operating s t a t e s , monitoring and 
secur i ty enhancement. 
2.2 Power System Operating States 
The power system 1s thought of as being run under t h r e e s e t s of 
c o n s t r a i n t s , ^ 2 9 ^ which are : 
- the load constra in ts 
- the operating constra ints 
- the secur i ty constra in ts 
The load constra ints simply recognise the prime task in power system 
operat ion, namely to meet the load demand. The operating c o n s t r a i n t s , 
furthermore, s t ipu la te the object ive of using the system components within 
permissible l im i ts and to meet the qual i ty standard of the system. 
Overloaded components, bus-voltages outside the to lerances and abnormal 
frequency deviat ions are examples of v io la t ions of the operating 
c o n s t r a i n t s . 
Some of the secur i ty constra ints are magnitude, a c c e s s i b i l i t y and 
locat ion of operating resources , l i m i t s in transmission capac i ty , e t c . The 
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system i s secure i f i t f u l f i l s the appropriate secur i ty constra ints in order 
to meet some cont ingencies. By means of these three sets of constra in ts 
four c l a s s e s of operating s ta tesC 2 8 H29] [30 'J [31 ] c a n b e a s fo l lows: 
(a) the normal s ta te 
Al l three se ts of constra in ts s a t i s f i e d , the object ive in t h i s s ta te i s 
to operate the system so as to remain in t h i s s t a t e and to a l l o c a t e 
generation to minimise tota l production cost within s e c u r i t y . 
(b) the a l e r t s ta te 
Loading and operating constra ints s a t i s f i e d but e x i s t i n g reserve 
margins are such that some disturbance would resu l t in a v io la t ion of some 
secur i ty c o n s t r a i n t s . The operating object ive in the a l e r t s ta te i s to 
return to the normal s ta te as rapidly as p o s s i b l e . 
(c ) the emergency s ta te 
Operating and secur i ty constra ints not s a t i s f i e d , load const ra in ts not 
necessar i ly s a t i s f i e d . The operating object ive in t h i s s ta te i s to prevent 
the spread of the emergency and to restore the system to at l eas t the a l e r t 
s t a t e . 
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(d) the restorat ion s ta te 
Operating constra in ts s a t i s f i e d , load and secur i ty constra in ts not 
s a t i s f i e d . This i s the s ta te of the system following an emergency where the 
emergency has been s t a b i l i s e d but the establishment of the normal s ta te has 
not yet been achieved. The operating object ive in t h i s s ta te i s to restore 
a l l se rv ices as rapidly as possible and to return to normal s t a t e . 
The four operating s ta tes and the t r a n s i t i o n between them are shown in 
Figure ( 2 . 1 ) . 
The t r a n s i t i o n s are caused by c o n t i n g e n c i e s and c o n t r o l a c t i o n s . 
According to these s t a t e s , secur i ty i s defined with respect to a set of 
random events ca l l ed the se t -o f -nex t -cont ingenc ies . 
T h i s i s a c o l l e c t i o n of disturbances that could occur . A system i s 
sa id to be secure i f i t i s in the normal s ta te and none of the contingencies 
could cause i t to enter the emergency s t a t e . 
As shown in Figure ( 2 . 1 ) , the function of the preventive control i s to 
take act ion to make the system secure . Some centres have programs that can, 
when they are act ivated by the operator, produce schedules to el iminate 
cer ta in l im i t v i o l a t i o n s . However, most preventive control i s manual. 
The funct ion of the emergency control i s to take cor rec t ive action to 
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make the system normal . As ide from load s h e d d i n g , which i s done in 
accordance with precalci l iated schedules and implemented by under-frequency 
r e l a y s , the operator i s usual ly responsible for a l l emergency c o n t r o l . The 
function of the res tora t ive control i s to restore serv ice to the system's 
loads. Al l res tora t ive decis ions are made by the operator. 
In the power system control centres the main emphasis has been given to 
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FIGURE 2.1 - POWER SYSTEM SECURITY STATES 
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2.3 Securi ty Functions in System Control 
Securi ty a s s e s s m e n t ' - 2 8 - " - 2 9 - ' i s the process of checking for v io la t ion of 
o p e r a t i n g l i m i t s on the power s y s t e m , in i t s p resent s t a t e or in an 
ant ic ipated future s t a t e , and e i ther in the in tac t condit ion or on the 
occurrence of a l i k e l y contingency. 
The purpose of contingency assessment i s to detect and a l e r t operators 
to insecure and abnormal condit ions so that cor rec t ive strategy may be 
planned and correct ive act ion taken. 
There are three basic functions in a secure control system, which a re : 
(a) secur i ty monitoring 
(b) secur i ty enhancement 
(c ) secur i ty ana lys is 
These are i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure ( 2 . 2 ) . 
2.3.1 Securi ty Monitoring 
Securi ty monitoring i s the on- l ine i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the actual 
operating s ta te of a system by checking real - t ime data to determine whether 
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FIGURE 2.2 REAL-TIME SECURITY CONTROL SYSTEM 
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The f i r s t step in secur i ty monitoring of power systems i s the set t ing 
up of a real - t ime database. The data acqu is i t ion function s t a r t s with the 
measurement of the physical quant i t ies in a power system such as bus voltage 
magnitude, l i n e flows and bus power i n j e c t i o n s . In addi t ion , data on the 
status (open or c losed) or c i r c u i t breakers, and switches are required. The 
measurements data are telemetered from locat ions to the control centre 
computer. Glar ingly bad data such as t rans ient excursions in the measured 
values are rejected by f i l t e r i n g the transmitted data through a simple check 
of t h e i r reasonableness or of the consistency between breaker status and 
analogue information, or by some smoothing rout ine . The real - t ime 
information about the status of c i r c u i t breakers and disconnect switches i s 
systemat ica l ly processed to determine the network conf igurat ion. 
Miss ing and erroneous data occur frequently in the real - t ime 
environment. Faced with er rors in the measurements, missing measurements, 
and er rors in the transmitted data , the ava i lab le data must be processed to 
ob ta in an es t imate of the s t a t e v a r i a b l e s , the v e c t o r of bus vo l tage 
magnitudes and phase angles , of the power system; that i s the task of the 
s ta te estimate program. 
The following function in secur i ty monitoring i s the on- l ine check on 
the operating l imi ts of the power system based on the ca lcu la ted va lues. 
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2 .3 .2 Securi ty Enhancement . 
Securi ty enhancement determines whether the system can be made secure . 
B a s i c a l l y , i t determines what preventive act ion should be taken to make an 
insecure system secure , or l e s s insecure . 
Prevent ive act ion requires an optimisation rout ine, or optimum power 
f low. Let us assume that a prevent ive-act ion solut ion can be found optimal 
or not; s ince the power system normally i s operated at minimum operating 
c o s t . System secur i ty w i l l have to be obtained at a p r i c e . I f the cost of 
the p r e v e n t i v e a c t i o n i s s m a l l , the opera tor can p l a c e the c o n t r o l i n 
e f f e c t . Where the cost i s high but the contingent emergency not too severe , 
the operator may decide not to take any act ion to improve system s e c u r i t y . 
I f i t i s not possible to f ind a prevent ive-act ion so lu t ion , a 
contingency plan would be developed by assuming that the contingency has 
occurred. The object ive of t h i s would be to minimise the amount of load to 
be c u r t a i l e d , t h i s strategy can be part of an emergency control funct ion. 
The de f in i t ion and object ives of real - t ime secur i ty assessment when the 
power system i s operating under emergency or s t r e s s f u l condit ions should be 
evaluated. Under these condi t ions , the object ives of operation change from 
cost minimisation to control of the system to bulk o s c i l l a t i o n and return 
the system to the normal operating s ta te and/or i n i t i a t e other control 
act ions towards a res tora t ive state to insure against cascading 
52 
interrupt ions and major blackouts. The computer software used in system 
operations should have the f l e x i b i l i t y to r e f l e c t these d i f ferent 
o b j e c t i v e s . 
2 .3 .3 Securi ty Analysis 
The r e l i a b l e and e f f i c i e n t operation of interconnected e l e c t r i c energy 
systems i s an important object ive for the nation and a chal lenging problem 
for power systems planners and a n a l y s t s . 
S e c u r i t y of a power system i s c o n s i d e r e d to be an i n s t a n t a n e o u s , 
t i m e - v a r y i n g c o n d i t i o n tha t i s a f u n c t i o n of the s y s t e m ' s robustness 
r e l a t i v e to imminent d is turbances. 
S e c u r i t y a n a l y s i s ' - 3 2 - ^ 3 3 ^ ' - 3 4 - ' c o n s i s t s of evaluating the system under 
various contingencies in order to obtain a measure of system secur i ty and 
providing inputs to enhancements s t r a t e g i e s . So, secur i ty of a power system 
i s defined with respect to a l i s t of possib le transmission l i n e outages and 
generator outages, c a l l e d cont ingencies. As the system condit ions change, 
the contingencies which cause insecure operation may a lso change. 
A framework was establ ished for determin is t ic s teady-s ta te secur i ty 
assessment, in which, the robustness of the system i s t e s t e d , using a power 
f low, on a set of se lected cont ingencies. The major components of the 
c l a s s i c a l secur i ty assessment in a modern control centre inc lude: s ta te 
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est imat ion, topology determination, contingency se lec t ion and eva luat ion , 
and secur i ty c o n t r o l . An in-depth survey of the c l a s s i c a l approach was 
presented by F.F.Wu and S .N .Ta lukar . ' - 3 0 - ' 
The determin is t ic technique requires that cer ta in c a l c u l a t i o n s such as 
load-flow unit commitment, and s t a b i l i t y s tudies be made for a l l conceivable 
future cont ingencies. The r e s u l t s of these studies are then reviewed and a 
judgement i s made of whether or not some correct ive act ion i s required to 
maintain adequate system s e c u r i t y . 
However, t h i s t echn ique does not take d i r e c t account of the unequal 
probabi l i ty of occurrence of each system's cont ingencies, and furthermore 
that the number of ways of reaching undesirable operating s ta tes i s not 
constant . Thus, when as the determin is t ic approach c l e a r l y ind icates those 
operating condit ions that would r e s u l t in a breach of system s e c u r i t y , i t 
does not supply a consistent c r i t e r i o n for c o n t r o l . Hence, the 
p r o b a b i l i s t i c approach was considered. 
The p r o b a b i l i s t i c approach i s not independent of the de termin is t ic 
technique but suppl ies a consistent c r i t e r i o n for control act ion given the 
r e s u l t s of the contingencies t e s t s . 
Because of uncertainty inherent in the predict ion "imminent 
d is turbances" , a p r o b a b i l i s t i c framework for secur i ty assessment i s more 
appropriate. Furthermore, most of the major power system break downs are 
54 
caused by problems associated with system dynamic response. Hence, dynamic 
models of the system should be represented in the secur i ty assessment. 
A framework for p r o b a b i l i s t i c dynamic secur i ty assessment has been 
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presented by F.F.Wu and T . K . T s a i . L J The d e v i a t i o n of p r o b a b i l i s t i c 
dynamic secur i ty assessment i s conceptually based on a two-level model of 
power systems. The f i r s t level of the model descr ibes the evolution of the 
system's s t ructura l s t a t e . The second level of the model descr ibes the 
t r a j e c t o r i e s of system var iables associated with component dynamics. ' - 3 6 - ' 
The two l e v e l s are coupled. 
In the p r o b a b i l i s t i c dynamic secur i ty assessment approach the secur i ty 
of a system i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d in terms of the s t e a d y - s t a t e and dynamic 
secur i ty regions. The time to insecur i ty i s used as the measure of system 
s e c u r i t y . A l i n e a r v e c t o r d i f f e r e n t i a l equat ion can be d e r i v e d whose 
solut ion gives the probabi l i ty that the time to insecur i ty i s greater than 
t . The c o e f f i c i e n t of the d i f f e r e n t i a l equations involve: component f a i l u r e 
and repair r a t e s , power generation, load demand and secur i ty regions. 
Techniques have been developed for obtaining steady-sta te and dynamic 
secur i ty regions. In the former case one i s in terested in s i tua t ions where 
system configurations are changing. The space of i n j e c t i o n , however, i s 
i n v a r i a n t . Hence, the s e c u r i t y reg ions in the space of i n j e c t i o n are 
137 "I 
charac te r ised . J 
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S i n c e the loss of t rans ient s t a b i l i t y i s a severe breach of s e c u r i t y , 
in the l a t t e r case dynamic secur i ty region a f te r a fau l t i s defined in terms 
of t rans ient s t a b i l i t y region. For t rans ient s t a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s , a power 
system i s considered as undergoing changes in configurations from p r e - f a u l t , 
f au l t - on , to p o s t - f a u l t . I f the i n i t i a l condition for the pos t - fau l t system 
l i e s in the region of asymptotic s t a b i l i t y of a s tab le post - fau l t 
equi l ibr ium, the system i s t r a n s i e n t l y s t a b l e . The Liapunov method has been 
widely used for t h i s analys is .L ' 3 8] [39] [40]L '41] 
The usual philosophy, in ex is t ing central secur i ty control systems, in 
performing secur i ty assessment could be character ised as determin is t ic in 
real - t ime environment. The OCEPS secur i ty assessment package i s based on 
the determin is t ic approach. 
2.4 Real-Time Security Assessment 
The f i r s t stage in the assessment of secur i ty i s the development of a 
s e t of events whose o c c u r r e n c e would be c o n s i d e r e d to be a breach of 
s e c u r i t y . 
In the course of the operat ion, a power system can be considered to be 
in t r a n s i t between d i f fe rent s teady-sta tes with smaller t ime-steps. By 
means of a few s e t s of c o n s t r a i n t s t h e s e c o n s e c u t i v e s t a t e s may be 
c l a s s i f i e d into a number of operating s t a t e s , charac te r is ing d i f ferent 
operating condi t ions . The sets of const ra in ts can be: 
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(a) the load constra in ts 
(b) the operating constra in ts 
(c ) the secur i ty constra ints 
The load constra ints simply recognise the prime task in power system 
operat ion, namely to meet the load demand. The operating c o n s t r a i n t s , 
furthermore, s t ipu la te the object ive of using the system components within 
permissible l i m i t s and to meet the qua l i ty standard of the system. These 
constra in ts can be: 
(a) voltage at any bus outside working tolerances 
(b) overload of any transmission l ine or other equipment 
(c) i n s u f f i c i e n t real or react ive generating capacity 
The concept of load and operating constra in ts might further be used to 
define the concept of s e c u r i t y . Thus, the secur i ty of the system equals the 
capab i l i t y of the system to meet cont ingencies, i . e . unplanned events, 
wi thout v i o l a t i n g the load and o p e r a t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s in the remaining 
system. Such contingencies t y p i c a l l y are forced outages or deratings of 
production uni ts and transmission components or essent ia l deviat ions from 
the forecasted load. 
To analyse the steady-state secur i ty problem, very e f f i c i e n t models and 
numerical techniques must be appl ied . For system operat ions, the Fast 
Decoupled Newton-Raphson load-flow program can be used as one of several 
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programs in an automated despatch centre. The program can incorporate the 
outages according to a contingency l i s t , thus indicating to the system 
operator the constraint violations that wil l result from a particular 
outage. The types of outage considered include single and multiple 
transmission line outages, load generation or station outage, transformer 
outages. 
The effect of load changes and generation rescheduling can be easily 
evaluated,^2][43][32] b ( j t t ) l e o u t a g e simulation of a line or transformer is 
more complex because these contingencies change the system configuration. 
The loss of a ' generator or reduction of generator output may 
precipitate voltage problems due to an inability to match reactive 
generation and load. It is therefore necessary to simulate the effect of 
partial or full generator outages on the power system which may be achieved 
by means of a load-flow study which has access to the actual state of the 
power system. 
As the system conditions change, the contingencies which cause insecure 
operation may also change. In the real-time environment i t is hardly 
feasible to perform on-line load-flows for all contingencies to determine 
how well the system, in its present state, can withstand these 
contingencies. Methods have been developed to rank contingencies according 
to the severity of their effects on bus voltages or line flows. On-line 
load-flows are then performed for each case starting at the top of the l i s t 
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and stopped when the case does not give problem. 
Some automatic contingency selection methods have been 
proposed.^44^23][45] p o r e a c h o utage considered in turn the results of the 
load-flow study are checked against the crit ical limits and any violations 
are brought to the attention of the operator. Such contingency evaluations 
are carried out at prespecified intervals and also whenever there is a 
change in the system. 
Figure (2.3) illustrates the typical components of a security 
assessment software package suitable for the real-time monitoring of 























FIGURE 2.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS SUBSYSTEM 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY OF NETWORK CHANGES 
3.1 Introduction 
The basic equations which can lead to the solution of a given network 
are derived from first principles using Ohm's law and Kirchloff's laws. The 
object of the theory of network changes is to obtain the solution to an 
intact network when i t is subjected to modifications. The solution to a 
linear or non-linear network can be easily obtained from the inverse of the 
admittance matrix. When the intact network is subjected to branch outages, 
the theory of simultaneous outages can be applied which determine the new 
solution from the previous or old solution by modification of the original 
impedance matrix. 
Diakoptics can be used for this purpose where the new solution can be 
obtained from the original solution in an efficient and organised manner. 
This chapter represents the theory of network modifications. Init ial ly, the 
solution to linear networks is investigated. Application of branch outages 
to non-linear networks is investigated in the following chapter. 
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3.2 Soluti on to Li near Networks 
The solution to linear network equations may involve the inverse of the 
bus admittance matrix, Y. There are two methods of approach: 
(a) to obtain Z in matrix form 
(b) to obtain Z in product form 
In the case of the former, the solution is obtained by directly 
inverting the bus admittance matrix: 
V o = lo ^ 
Vo = V 1 ! o ( 3 ' 2 > 
or V„ = l l n (3.3) 
O O O * ' 
There are many ways of obtaining YQ~*. One of the simplest and most 
effective ways of calculating the inverse of large matrices in connection 
with power system analysis is the generalisation of the elimination process. 
It is most easily understood by considering two simultaneous equations: 
*11V1 + *12V2 = h ( 3 ' 4 ) 
*21 v l + * 2 2 v 2 = (3.5) 
Dividing (3.5) by y 2 2 and re-arranging: 
v 2 = y 2 2 _ 1 ^2 " y 2 1 v l * * 3 , 6 ) 
Substituting into the equation (3.4) for v 2 gives: 
( y n ' v i + *v#'\ih = h . ( 3 - 7 ) 
The above equation can be writen in matrix form with v 2 and 
interchanged: 









y ' l l = y l l 'hi^zzhi 
y ' l 2 = y 1 2 y *22 
y ' 2 2 = y * 2 2 
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The process can be repeated to interchange v^  and i^. The order in 
which the interchange is carried out is unimportant and can be extended to 
any number of variables and leads to the following set of rules'-^6-': 
-1 
dd 
(b) y ' r d = y r d y ' d d 
(c) y ' r c - y r c - y ' r d y d c 
<d> y'dc "y'dd^dc 
r = 1 n, r *d 
r = 1 n, c = 1 
r * d , c * d 
c = 1 n 
c * d 
where 
y d d = diagonal element in row and column d 
y = element in row r and column c rf rc 
y' = new element which replaces its predecessor 
The process is repeated for all diagonal elements taken in any order, with 
the new elements stored in the position of previous values. 
When sparsity techniques are used, signif icant savings in storage and 
computation time can be achieved i f a programming scheme is used which 
stores and processes only the non-zero elements. The inverse of the 
admittance matrix is not explicitly available. The best known are 
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triangular decomposition and the product form of the inverse. The 
bifactorisation method is a very important recent modification of Gauss 
elimination. It is particularly suitable for analysing large, sparse 
systems that have non-zero diagonal elements which predominate over 
off-diagonal elements that are either symmetrical or, i f asymmetrical, have 
a symmetric sparsity structure. The method combines the triangulation and 
the product form to express the inverse of a matrix A as the product of 2n 
matrices: 
L A R = U (3.8) m m 
L n L 2 L 1 A Rj R2 R n = U (3.9) 
A R, R9 R = L , " 1 L , " 1 L " 1 (3.10) 
1 2 n 1 2 n 
A R,R9 R L L> L, = U (3.11) 
1 2 n n 2 1 
R,R9 R L L-L, = A"1 (3.12) 
1 2 n n ' l 
where 
R = right-hand factor matrices 
L = left-hand factor matrices 
U = unit matrix 
n = order of matrix 
For computing, the following rules can be developed: 
k k 
1) R ^ = L k i (only for symmetrical matrices, k column of is identical 
to the k row of R )^ 
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2> L \ k -
3> L k1k • * k \ <>k~\l 1 ' <"•!> " 
4> R k k j ' - " " u /"""tt J • < k n » " 
5) ^ . . " " ^ - * \ ^ , J > \ , . j W j . . . . . . . . n 
Any one column can be obtained from the solution of (3.12) with the 
right-hand vector set to zero except for unity in the position corresponding 
to the desired column of the inverse matrix. 
3.3 Theory of network changes 
3.3a Application of diakoptics to the theory of branch outages^46^ 
Assuming that VQ is known from the solution of the original equations: 
Y 0 V0 - I„ (3.13) 
where YQ represents the original admittance matrix, i t is required to 
find new value after one branch in the network has been modified. The 
modification may be addition of branches, removal of branches, or changes in 
the branch admittances. The procedure to remove branches or to change the 
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admittance of branches is the same. If a branch is removed which is not 
mutually coupled to any other branch, the modified bus impedance matrix can 
be obtained by adding, in parallel with the branches, a link whose 
admittance is equal to the negative of the admittance of the branch to be 
removed. If the admittance of an uncoupled branch is changed, the modified 
bus impedance can be obtained by adding a link in parallel with the branch 
such that the equivalent admittance of the two branches is the desired 
From the solution to the original network, the solution to the modified 
network can be obtained by applying diakoptics. Consider the network shown 
in Figure (3.1), where only one branch is modified from y = y n to y = o. 
I I I I 01 
1 
I I l ' l 







i < f 
A 1 I 
V V, 
V l • 'o 
(c) simulated modified network 
V i = V 1 ! 
(d) simulated modified network 
Figure 3.1 Network Changes 
For above yj^  = -yQ 
From Figure (3.1c): 
(3.14) 
or in matrix form: 
h=h C l V l (3.15) 
where 
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(C) is referred to as the connection matrix and consists of as many elements 
as there are nodes. It is established by inspection and has elements +1 (for 
sending end i ) , -1 (for receiving end j ) and null everywhere else. Hence, 
multiplication by (C) reduces to simple summation only. From Figure (3.1.d): 
I x = -C x i x (3.16) 
(3.15) + (3.16): 
h = " c i y i C i t V l ( 3 , 1 7 ) 
From Figure (3.Id): 
YQ V, - IQ + h (3.18) 
. . Vx - Z 0 I Q + Z 0 I L (3.19) 
From Figure (3.1a): 
\ - Vo ( 3 - 2 0 ) 
(3.20)-> (3.19) and (3.17) • (3.19): 
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v i = vo " zo c i h C i t V l <3-21> 
Multiplying (3.21) by C ^ : 
c i t v i = c i t v o " C i t zo c i * i C i t V l ( 3 ' 2 2 ) 
(1 + ZQ Cx y x ) V1 = VQ (3.23) 
Let f x = (y^" 1 
Dividing (3.23) by y ^ 
( f i + C i t zo C i ) h C i t v i = C i t V0 ( 3 * 2 4 ) 
Let d x = ( f 1 + ZQ C j ) " 1 (3.25) 
From (3.24) 
y x Cj* - d x VQ (3.26) 
(3.26) + (3.21): 
v i ' vo " zo c i d i C i t V0 ( 3 ' 2 7 ) 
Hence, if the solution to the original network ( i .e . VQ) and ZQ are available, 
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the new solution can be obtained without forming ly 
It can be shown (as in 3.3f) that if d^^ = 0 a split network results. The 
reason is because the new impedance Z 1 becomes singular. 
3.3b Development of the algorithm for simultaneous branch outages^7^ 
It was shown in section (3.3a) that after removing a branch from a 
network, the new solution would be: 
1 Zo C l d l c l * Vo 
From Figure (3.1b): 
V l " Z l lo (3.28) 
From (3.27) and (3.28): 
1 1 0 0 0 - Zo C l Zo C l d l C l t Z_ I 
" Z0 " Z0 C l d l C l 0 (3.29) 
71 
Hence, the solution procedure for single fault can be summarised as: 
1) X ^ Z ^ j 
2) dx = ( f x + Cj* X ^ " 1 
3) b - dj Cj* VQ 
4) Vj - VQ - Xxb 
where: 
X^  is the difference of column i and j of ZQ 
Cj* X^  is the difference of element i and j of X^  
•G-j* V Q is the difference of element i and j of Vg _ 
The theory of simultaneous branch outages can be generalised to cater for any 
number of faults (modifications). For the second outage, ZQ in (3.27) must be 
changed to 1^ to incorporate f irst outage. It is not necessary to evaluate 
full Z 1 ; i t is sufficient to evaluate Z 1 C 2 only. From first outage Xj 
and d, are available. 
Multiply (3.29) by C 2 : 
Z l C2 = Z0 C2 " Z0 C l d l C l t Z0 C2 ( 3 - 3 0 ) 
or X 2 = W - Xxa 
where: 
X2 = Z l C2 
W = Z Q C 2 
a = d x C ^ W 
V2 can be obtained from V :^ 
2^ = 1^ "" ^ 1 2^ 2^ ^2 1^ 
. i - V g V - j — X-2 dg-Gg-*- VT - - - (3.31)-
where: 
d 2 = ( f 2 + Z X C 2 ) _ 1 
d 2 = ( f 2 + C 2 4 X 2) - 1 (3.32) 
Hence, the solution procedure for double simultaneous outage i s : 
1) xx = z0 c x 
2) d x = ( f x + X x ) - 1 
3) b = d x VQ 
4) V l = VQ - X x b 
5) W = Z Q C 2 
6) a = W 
7) X 2 = W - X x a 
8) d 2 = ( f 2 + X 2 ) - 1 
9) b = d 2 Cg* V x 
10) V 2 = V x - X 2 b 
where: 
U i s the d i f fe rent of column i and j of Z 
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C^" X 2 i s the d i f ference of element i and j of X 2 
i s the d i f ference of element i and j of Vj 
A lso : 
Z 2 = Z l " Z l C 2 d 2 C 2 t Z l ( 3 , 3 3 ) 
For the t h i r d fau l t mult iply (3.29) and (3.33) by C 3 : 
Z l C 3 = Z 0 C 3 " Z 0 C l d l C l t Z 0 C 3 ( 3 ' 3 4 ) 
Z 2 C 3 = Z l C 3 " Z l C 2 d 2 C2 l l C 3 * 3 , 3 5 ) 
From (3 .34 ) : 
W = W - X x a 
where: 
w = zx c 3 
W = Z 0 C 3 
x = z o C l 
a = d x W 
From (3 .35 ) : 
where: 
X 3 = Z 2 C 3 
V 3 can be writ ten in terms of (as in (3 .27) ) ; 
V 3 = V 2 " Z 2 C 3 d 3 C 3 t V 2 
or: 
where: 
d3 = (f3 + c 3 t z3 c 3 ) - x 
or: 
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V 3 = V 2 - X 3 b (3.36) 
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d 3 - ( f 3 + C 3 t X 3 ) - 1 (3.37) 
b = d 3 C j * V 2 (3.38) 
Hence, addit ional procedures for the t h i r d outage are: 
1) w = z Q c 3 
2) a = dj_ W 
3) • W - W - a 
4) a ' = d 2 C 2 * W 
5) X - W - X, a ' 
6) d 3 = ( f 3 + X 3 ) - 1 
7) b = d 3 C 3 l V 2 
8) V 3 = V 2 - X 3 b 
A l s o : 
h-h- h c 3 d 3 c 3 * h (3,39) 
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For the fourth outage mult iply ( 3 . 2 9 ) , ( 3 .33 ) , (3.39) by C 4 ; a l s o , 
mul t ip l ica t ion of (3.33) by C i s requi red. Hence, the addit ional procedures 
can be shown to be: 
1) W = Z Q c 4 
2) a = d x W 
3) W = W - X x a 
4) a ' = d 2 Cg* W 
5) W" = W - X 2 a ' 
6) a" = d 3 C 3 t W 
7) X 4 = W" - X 3 a" 
8) d 4 = ( f 4 + C 4 * X 4 ) 
9) b = d 4 V 3 
10) v4 = v3 - x4 b 
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I t can be seen from the above that except for the f i r s t outage, the rest 
follow a s i m i l a r pat tern . The process i s in a recurs ive manner. The flow 
diagram of Figure (3 .2) was developed: 
i = 1, n where n i s the number of outages 
w = z 0 c . 
For i * 1 
j = 1, i-1 
a = d . W 
J J 
W = W - X. a 
J 
X. -_W - - - ._ 
d, - ( f , • < : , * x,)- 1 
a - d, c, 4 v,-i 
v i ' v i - i " X1 a 
Figure 3.2 Flow diagram for simultaneous branch modif ications 
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and X. must be stored for next f a u l t , V i can be overwri t ten, a , d, f are 
s ing le elements, W, Z Q , C , V, X are vectors . 
A numerical example i s solved in Appendix B to i l l u s t r a t e the appl icat ion 
of the recurs ive method to l i n e a r networks. 
3.3c Node addit ion and removal ^ 4 6-^ 
The network modification process can be used to modify e x i s t i n g branches 
as well as to network extensions. This can be i l l u s t r a t e d from the following 
example: 
j i j k 
T" TT—JT-J" 
(a) or ig ina l network (b) Extended network (c) simulated network 
I I 1 '1 Y„ V, = 1 + 1 o l o 1 
Figure 3.3 Network Extension 
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From Figure ( 3 . 3 c ) : 
v l " Z o ! o + Z o h (3*40) 
From Figure ( 3 . 3 a ) : 
and 
: th 
therefore from (3 .40) : 
V v * \ 
V V ^ \ 
where Ij^ i s known nodal current at node k. 
Node i s o l a t i o n i s a specia l case which can be dealt with here . Suppose that 
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the or ig ina l network be represented by Figure (3 .3b ) , for which the network 
s o l u t i o n w i l l be Y Q V 0 = I Q . I f branch y be removed, node k w i l l be 
i s o l a t e d . This can be simulated by in jec t ing a current equal to -1^ to node 
j . The new 1^  i s : 
: t h 
Therefore equation (3.40) can be solved except for v^. 
3.3d Asymmetry^ 4 6^ 
I t i s sometimes necessary to analyse problems which have asymmetrical 
c o e f f i c i e n t matr ix . Such problems a r i s e , for example, when transformers 
with quadrature taps are represented. In genera l , such an asymmetry ocurrs 
in only few elements but necess i ta tes the ca lcu la t ions and storage of the 
f u l l c o e f f i c i e n t matr ix . I f symmetry i s to be preserved, the asymmetry can 
be transformed as an in jec ted current and the problem solved i t e r a t i v e l y . A 
b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e i s to be s o l v e the symmetr ica l problem f i r s t and 
represent the asymmetry as network modi f icat ions. This can be i l l u s t r a t e d 
by considering the solut ion of the following asymmetrical problem: 
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1 1 1 1 





1 1 1 1 
1 
2V 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
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or in general form as: 
(3.42) 
The solut ion of the asymmetrical problem can be now be wri t ten a s : 
V l * Z o lo ~ Z o h (3.43) 
10 5 4 2 
5 3 2 1 
_4 2 2 1 
2 1 1 1 
21 
11 
• Z o *o 
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Z I, = 2 Vn 10 Therefore: V, = 21 - 2V, (10) V 1 
/ 
V. » 11 - 2V. (5) V. = 1 
»2 *2 » *2 
V1 = 9 - 2V. (4) 
A 3 A 2 
V, = 5 - 2V (2) 
U *2 
V = 1 
x 3 
V = 1 
A 4 
3.3e Appl icat ion to non- l inear elments ( e . g . d . c . l i n k s ) 
I f the removed element i s non- l inear , then the current flowing in i t 
can be defined a s : 
1 i * f < " i \ V (3.44) 
Compare with (3.14) 
From equation (3 .19 ) : 
Vi = Z I + Z n I , 
1 0 0 0 1 
(3.20) (3.19) and (3.16) (3 .19 ) : 
l o o . (3.45) 
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Multiply (3.45) by C t 
c * v i s C* V - C* l n CI l o o 1 
Writing e x p l i c i t l y the 1 and j equations: 
X i ° i V ° i i ° i j 1 
V l . " V o . " < Z o.. " Z o . . > h 
J J J l JJ 
The above equat ions, in conjunction with equation (3.44) can be solved as a 
set of two simultaneous non- l inear equations in two var iab les (V, , V, J and 
hence for 1^ from (3 .44 ) . F i n a l l y solut ion for can be obtained from 
(3 .46) : 
3.3f S p l i t Network 
As the s i z e of the networks i n c r e a s e s , i t i s possib le to tear the 
network i n t o s u b d i v i s i o n s . The s o l u t i o n to the untorn network can be 
obtained from the solut ion to the subd iv is ions . For each subdivis ion the 
theory of network changes can be a p p l i e d and i t can be shown t h a t the 
general equation (3.27) withholds. 
(3.46) 
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When a s p l i t network a r i s e s as a consequence of a branch outage, each 
sub-system formed w i l l , independently of the o thers , cater for the supply of 
i t s own loads i f p o s s i b l e . The s p l i t condit ion can be e a s i l y detected from 
the c a l c u l a t i o n of a s c a l a r f a c t o r "d" de f ined f o r branch o u t a g e s , as 
fo l lows: 
Consider Figure (3 .4) which represents two sub-networks connected by the t i e 
between buses i and j having the admittance equal to J^y I t i s in te res t ing 
to see what happens when the t i e i s removed. 
1 \ 
Figure 3.4 Network Interconnection 
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Figure 3.5 Equivalent C i r c u i t 
where Z A and Z & represent the equivalent impedances of the two sub-networks. 
Figure (3 .5) i s representing the admittance network for which the admittance 
matrix i s : 
Y = 
0 









Hence the impedance matrix would be obtained from the inverse of Y above, 
as: 
Z = 
ZA h h 
ZA h + i 
y i j 
h 
y i j J 1 J 
(3.48) 
However, 'd' as in the theory of branch outages is defined as: 
1/d = (f + C b ZQC) 
where: 
f + c Z o C = f + Z o i i + Z o i i " 2 Z o i j 
(3.49) 
Applying (3.49) to (3.48) y ie lds: 
1/d = ( - J _ ) + Z A + Z A + ( J _ ) - 2 Z A 
. . 1/d = 0 where for the above i = 1, j = 2, f = - l / y ^ 
Hence, a sp l i t network results when 1/d = 0 (see Appendix 2 for a numerical 
example). 
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3.3g Node Merge 
When a network is subjected to branch modifications, the effect would 
be simulated in ' f where: 
1/d = f + C t ZQC 
' f represents the modified branch impedance as was explained in section 
(3.3a) 
Under short c i rcui t conditions between 2 buses, one bus would reside on 
the top of another, i . e . the e f fect can be simulated by adding a l ine 
between the shorted buses of impedance f = o. 
Hence, when considering short c i r c u i t s , ' f in the above equation must 
be set to zero. The theory of branch modifications withholds, however, 
equal voltages wil l be obtained for the corresponding shorted nodes (see 
Appendix 2 for a numerical example). 
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF BRANCH 
OUTAGES TO LOAD-FLOW 
4.1 Introduction 
Load-flow calculations are performed in system planning, operational 
planning and operation/control. For steady state security assessment of the 
existing and future system, a load-flow solution method capable of computing 
a large number of s ingle and multiple contingency studies reasonably 
accurately is necessary, and particularly in the system operations context, 
i t must be fast and ef f ic ient . This makes the fast decoupled AC load flow 
solution ideal for this purpose. 
This chapter represents the application of the recursive branch outage 
routine to load-flow and investigates i t s speed and accuracy. 
4.2 Summary of fast decoupled load- f low 1 - 4 8 - 1 1 4 9 3 
I f an approximate root x r of a simple algebraic non-linear equation i s 
known, then a better approximation can be obtained from: 
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r+1 f ( x r ) / f ' ( x r ) 
or: 
r+1 r x = x - A x 
where: 
A x = f ( x r ) / f ( x r ) 
Above is known as Newton-Raphson method and can be extended to a set of 
simultaneous non-linear equations, in which case 
A x = J " 1 F ( x r ) 
The square matrix J i s the Jacobian matrix of F(x) whose ( i , k ) element is 
defined as 3 f i / 3 x k . 
To use the algorithm for load-flow solution i t is only necessary to write 
the equations defining the load-flow problem as a set F(x) = 0. 
The well-known polar power mismatch Newton method is the formal application 
of the above algorithm for solving non-linear equations (see equations 4.4, 
4 .5 ) , and constitutes successive solutions of the sparse real Jacobian 
matrix equation: 
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For PV and PQ nodes 






where A G . and A V . are the corrections for angle and voltage magnitude at 









The elements of the Jacobian matrix can be made value symmetrical by 






A V / V 
(4.3) 
where the elements of this Jacobian matrix can be obtained by 
differentiating the mismatch equations given by: 
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*1 " P 1 S P " V1 ( G i k C 0 S 6 l k + B ik s i n 9 i k ) Vk = 0 < 4' 4> 
= ^ i S P " V i l e . <Gik s i n 8 i k " B i k c o s 6 i k ) Vk = 0 <4-5> 
For PV-node only (4.4) is required and for slack node no equations are 
required. However, as an inherent characteristic of any practical power 
system is the close dependence of active power flows on bus voltage angle 







A V / V 
(4.6) 
where: 
H . . = 3 A P . / 3 6 . = Q . S P + V . 2 B . . 
H i k =
 3 AV3^ = " V i ( G i k S i n 6 i k " B ik C 0 S Q i k > Vk 
L „ =V. 3 A V 3 V . = -Q- SP + V . 2 B i . 
L i k = Vk 3Q./3V k + H i k (4.7) 
Further approximations in the decoupled Jacobian matrix (4.6) can be made: 
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C O S 0 j k 2 1 
Q 1 « B-. V . 2 
G i k s i n Q i k « B ik c o s Q i k ( 4 - 8 ) 
from which the elements of the (4.7) reduce to: 
Hik • v i Bik vk hk - vi Bik \ <4-9> 
or as: 
tf./V. - V i B.. AQj • I B . , Vk 
k ei 
k#i 
* V V i • B i i *1 + kIJik k^ ( 4' 1 Q) 
k*j 
The f i r s t equation relates /f to therefore any terms which predominantly 
affect changes in tQ can also be omitted. For example, by setting the 
voltages on the right-hand side to unity results i n : 
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A P / V = B' A © 
A Q / V = B" AV (4.11) 
The matrix B' and B" is the negative of the imaginary part of the nodal 
admittance matrix Y, without the column and row correspondence to the slack 
node. Faster convergence can be obtained by neglecting the resistance when 
calculating the terms of B ' , hence: 
B ' i k = 1 / x i k B " ik = x i k / ( R i k + X i k ) 
B ' i i = - n / x i k B " i i = - i B " i k 
M k*i ^ * L £ ) 
Figure (4.1) i l lustrates the flow chart for the fast-decoupled 
Newton-Raphson. 
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4.3 Automatic Control and Adjustment1- J 
A general purpose load-flow program should include the e f fec t of 
automatic control devices such as on-load transformer taps, phase-shifter, 
area interchange, as well as upper and lower l im i ts on react ive power 
generation and voltage l imi ts . Conventionally, adjustments are made at each 
iterative step by easi ly programmable logical c r i t e r i a . The process of 
correction can also be made using sensit iv i ty factors which relate the 
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change in a controlling variable to the change produced in the controlled 
variable. 
A transformer with off-nominal tap setting may be represented by an ideal 
transformer in series with the transformer nominal admittance, as shown in 
Figure (4 .2) . 
I I 
1 
I 1:T I 
1 
Figure (4.2) Transformer Representation 
where: 
T - t + jq (4.13) 
T t T 
_ * 
/ » Z I _ * (4.14) 
therefore: 
v t - T v i 
also T k - y ( V K - V t) 
substituting for VI: 
hence: 
T. = T* y ( T ? . - V k ) 






( t 2 + q 2 ) y - (t+jq) y 
- ( t + jq) y y (4.20) 
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Hence, the elements of the nodal admittance matrix can be modified according 
to the above. With the complex turns rat io, the Y matrix wil l no longer be 
symmetrical. When the off-nominal taps are in-phase, that is q=0, a simple 
equivalent * c i rcui t can be deduced from equation (4.20) and is shown in 
Figure (4.3) . 
I I ty 
V / 14 t f c-t)y ( l - t )y 
Figure (4.3) In-phase off-nominal taps 
For phase shi f ters , the asymmetry in Y-matrix can be eliminated by 




T T y - T y 
-T Y 7 
v i 2jqy V. 
(4.21) 
which can be represented by a symmetrical ir network as shown in Figure 
(4.4) : 
(TT*-T)y (l-t)7 
Figure (4.4) Phase Shifter representation 
The additional injected current can be treated as additional power source: 
3 / = -2jqy*V. V k * (4.22) 
The phase shifter can be incorporated in the fast decoupled load-flow method 
as follows: 
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(a) The calculation of mismatch functions is carried out exactly with 
admittances as shown by equation (4.21) and adding to the specified power 
S , . s ' ) correction for the asymmetry of the phase-shifter given by equation 
(4.23). 
(b) Representing the phase-shifter in the constant matrix B 1 and B" by: 
B ' i i - B ' k k - - 1 / X 
B ' i k = B ' k . - 1 / X 
B " i i = B"kk = - x / ( r 2 + x 2 ) * - ! / x 
B" . k = B" k . = X/(R 2+X 2) « 1/X (4.23) 
4.3.1 On-load transformer tap-changing 
An automatic on-load tap-changing transformer usually controls a local 
bus voltage. Sometimes discrete adjustment in tap steps i s used, but more 
usually the continuous approach is preferred. A conventional adjustment 
feedback error for a continuous in-phase off-nominal tapping t.. P.U. 
controlling the voltage of bus k to V k s p P.U. i s : 
t .^w . t . o l d i 0 ( ^ r _ ^ s P ) ( 4 2 4 ) 
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for the tap in quadrature, i f present: 
new old + B (P ik ^i k (4.25) 
where: 
t.. = in-phase tap position 
q.. = quadrature tap position 
P i k = active power through the phase-shifter 
a =1 for fast decoupled Newton-Raphson load-flow 
= 0.2 for Gauss-sidal load-flow 
For the PV-node i i t i s usual to calculate Q^r to maintain V at V . s p up to 
l imit , before adjusting the transformer in-phase tap position i f both 
controls are available. 
4.4 Transmission-line Outages 
From (4.11) angles and voltages can be obtained for each i terat ion: 
A G = B -1 AP/V (4.26) 
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AV = B ii -1 AQ/V (4.27) 
Line outages can be simulated by the adaption of the inverse-matrix 
modification technique (as in Chapter 3) to B' and B" as follows. In the 
most general case, the outage of a l ine can be reflected in B' by modifying 
two elements in row k and two in j . The new outage matrix is then: 
b = line series admittance 
c = column vector which is null except for C^ = 1 and Cj = -1 . 
Depending on the types of the connected buses, only one row k or j might be 
present in B' (or B"), in which case either C k or Cj above i s zero, as 
appropriate. It can be shown that: 
B 
new = B' + b a (4.28) 
where: 
B -1 = B -1 - X d C B -1 (4.29) 
new 
where: 
d = (f + C- X)" 
and: 
X = B ' " 1 C 
f = b ' 1 (4.30) 
The new angles can be found from: 
A ® n o ^ " B ' n a w _ 1 A P / V ( 4 . 3 1 ) new new 
Hence, from (4.29) and (4.30), the new angles are found as: 
A G n e w = A 0 - B' C d C* A© (4.32) 
compare with (3.27) 
Similarly, 
A V N Q 1 1 = A V - B " C d' C * A V (4.33) new 
where: 
d' = ( f + C* X ' ) " 1 
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f = b , - i 
Also: 
b = 1/X. k , b' - X . k / ( R i k 2 + X . k 2 ) 
Mismatch equations also need modifications before the tolerance i s checked. 
Depending on the type of buses involved, the following rules must be obeyed: 
(a) I f the outage occurs between a slack and a PV bus or between two PV 
buses, B" requires no modifications (see equation 4.1) . 
(b) The connection vector C has elements +1, -1 and null everywhere e lse . 
When modifying the angles i f the outage include slack bus, zero is placed in 
the corresponding element of the connection matrix. The same happens when 
modifying the voltages i f the outage occurs between a PV and a PV or slack 
bus. 
4.5 Application of the recursive method to load-flow 
As i l lustrated above, the angles and voltages need to be modified after 
each iteration and the modifications required, ref lect the mismatch 
equations and B' and B". Equations (4.32) and (4.33) are just as (3.27); 
therefore after each i terat ion, the old angles and voltages can be modified 
106 
by applying the recursive rout ine. The flow diagram of Figure (4.5) 
i l lustrates how this is done. When the convergence is achieved the active 
and reactive powers at each bus are obtained from: 
p i " V i 2 G i i + V i = ( Q ik c o s 0 i k + B i k s i n 0 i k ) vk < 4 ' 3 4 > 
K el 
k*i 
Q. - - V . 2 B.. • V. (G . k s i n e . , - B 1 k cose. , ) V, (4.35) 
k*i 
See Appendix 2 for a numerical example. 
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START WITH INITIAL: V r =1, er=o 
FACTORISE B', B" using sparsity 
ITER = ITER+1 
1 
i = i+1 
SLK 
BUS = ? > 
PV or PQ 
Find AP 1"/V r from (4.4) 
Solve for A 8 from ( 4 . 2 0 
8 - c + A c 
4 




Find A Q r / V r from (4.5) 
Solve for AV r from (4 .£ l ) 
V r + 1 = V r + AV r 
1 
CHECK for convergence JZ> 
not converged 
converged 
Calculate Q for PV node (4* ' * ) 
P and Q for SLK (4.22), (4 .3S) 
t 
output results 
FIGURE 4.1. FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FAST DECOUPLED LOAD FLOW 
START WITH INITIAL: V r =1, 8r=0 
I 
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FACTORISE B' , B" using sparsity 
ITER = 1TER+1 
input data for outage 
study and do correct-
ions for mismatch 
equations 
X 
i = i+1 
" SLK < BUS = ? > 
PV or PQ 
Find A P r / V r from (4.4) 
I Solve for A8 r from (4.2*$} Modify A 6 r using . 
recursive routine 
e r + 1 = e r + A e r 




Find A Q r / V r from (4.5) 
Solve for AV r from (4.27) Modify AV r using 
recursive routine 
v r + 1 = V r + AV r , 1 
t 




Calculate Q for PV node (4.3*/) 
P and Q for SLK (4.22), (4.25) 
> 
output results 
FIGURE 4 .5 FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FAST DECOUPLED LOAD FLOW 
FOR CONTINGENCY STUDIES 
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CHAPTER 5 
AUTOMATIC CONTINGENCY SELECTION (ACS) 
5.1 Introduction 
Modern energy control centres ut i l ised in e lectr ic u t i l i t y control and 
monitor schemes are required to provide real-time security assessments. If 
the potential outage of a l ine or a generator would result in the overload 
of another l ine , then the system is said to be vulnerable, a condition which 
should be quickly detected for possible corrective rescheduling actions in 
operation, or for system redesign in planning. 
The Automatic Contingency Selection (ACS) problem i s concerned with 
developing computer algorithms for quickly identifying those contingencies 
which may cause out -o f - l im i t conditions so as to reduce the number of 
contingencies that need to be evaluated when assessing the power system's 
security in a real-time environment. 
This chapter presents an ACS algorithm for the determination of a l l the 
contingencies that give either voltage or l ine flow problems when the system 
is subjected to single line outages. The ACS captures a l l the contingencies 
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that give out-of-limit conditions and ranks the l ines according to the 
severity that they might cause i f the network 1s subjected to their outage. 
I n i t i a l l y , a survey of some ACS approaches is presented. 
5.2 ACS Techniques 
An accepted procedure for on-line steady-state security assessment in 
present Energy Control Centres is by the evaluation of a large number of 
contingency cases. However, the computational burden that this procedure 
places in even the most advanced of present day computer instal lat ions has 
prompted the need for studying procedures for the automatic selection of 
meaningful contingency c a s e s . The object ive i s the reduction of the 
possible cases for consideration and at the same time the determination of a 
ranking or ordering of these cases according to severity, for further study. 
Traditional contingency analysis uses a simple logical rule to c lass i fy 
contingency case results. This logical rule asks i f any system components 
wil l experience an out-of-limit condition from a particular contingency. If 
the answer to this question is yes , the case is alarmed, or otherwise noted, 
for the user; i f the answer i s no, the case is ignored. The drawback to 
this technique is the time which must be consumed in calculating the system 
conditions for each case before a limit check can be made. 
To overcome t h i s , contingency selection techniques were developed which 
attempt to rank the cases by severity so that detailed system conditions 
I l l 
need only be calculated for those cases at the top of the ranking. 
The development of a contingency selection technique has two aspects. 
F i r s t , one must develop a straightforward way to compare and rank the 
severity of one contingency versus another. Past research has concentrated 
on the use of a Performance Index (PI) which, when calculated for each 
contingency case, indicates i t s relative severity. The second aspect in the 
development of a contingency ranking algorithm i s the creat ion of an 
algorithm to ef f ic ient ly calculate the value of the PI for each contingency 
case. It i s desirable to combine these two stages. However, such attempts 
in the past have resulted in misranking. For ACS, a system performance 
index is defined. The sensit iv i ty of performance index i s used to rank the 
contingencies according to the severity of their effects on the system 
performance. This ranked contingency l i s t is used to reduce the number of 
contingencies which require ful l contingency analysis solution. 
One measure of quality of a performance index is i t s capture rat io , 
which is the ratio of the number of truly severe contingency cases to the 
total number of cases in the top portion of the ranked case l i s t . Other 
measures can also be used to show the quality of a particular PI . 
As to computation, a good contingency se lect ion i s not simply a 
repeated calculation for each contingency case. Instead, i f one took as a 
maximum the time required for execution of a ful l AC load-flow for each 
contingency case, then a good contingency selection algorithm ought to be 
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able to rank a l l cases in one to five percent of this maximum time. 
Most of the existing ACS procedures ^ 5 0 " 5 1 ^ are based on l ine overload 
limit violations where PI is expressed as a function of normalised line 
flows and the use of DC load-flow (P-e) equations. The voltage l imi t 
violations are included by calculating the voltage changes from the 
linearised load-flow (Q-V) equat ions . ' -^ All these methods are useful for 
analysing single branch outages only. In particular, two approaches based 
o n ^ 5 ^ and'- 5 1-' are useful for on-line security analysis. These methods are 
based on DC load-flow analysis and derive a closed form solution for the 
s e n s i t i v i t y of performance index for an outage of a l i n e . The two 
algorithms are different in the way they calculate the sensit ivi ty of PI . 
Identification of the contingencies that warrant further study by means 
of ful l AC-load-flow solution, may be achieved by predicting the values of 
PI for each line outage and subsequently ranking the contingencies from the 
most important to the least important (largest and smallest value of P I ) . 
The predicted value of PI can be computed e i ther from a Taylor s e r i e s 
expansion of the PI as a function of the susceptance of the outaged l ine , or 
l'54'l 
using the DC-load-flow approach as reported i n . J The above approaches 
i'511 
are summarised in L . 
Ejebe and Wallenberg defined two Pis for voltage analysis . One of the 
performance indices was defined as a non-linear function of bus voltage 
deviations. The second index was a modification of the f i r s t index to 
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include the effect of generator MVAr limit violations. They described a 
procedure for ranking contingencies by computing the s e n s i t i v i t i e s of 
performance indices with respect to outages. A gradient technique was used 
to predict the change in the performance index by using Tellegen's theorem 
to calculate the terms of the gradient. The imperfections showed up as 
misrankings of some contingency cases. That i s , some contingency cases 
which should have ranked higher in p r i o r i t y were low on the l i s t and 
T551 
conversely, others which should have ranked low were too high. J 
Medicherla and Rastogi developed a contingency solution technique which 
uses the load curtailment required to raise bus voltages to the 
1551 
pre-contingency level as an indication of the seventy of a contingency. 
The load curtailment approach can provide a measure of the effect of a 
contingency leve l . In this approach the PI for a given contingency is 
defined as an aggregate sum of load required to be curtailed at the buses to 
raise bus voltages to the pre-contingency leve l . The performance indices 
for a l l contingencies are computed, and then the contingencies are ranked in 
order of the decreasing values of P i s . Whereas the performance index 
defined i s of very high quality the calculation of this performance index is 
computationally not attractive. 
One common approach used to obtain the contingency l i s t in today's EMS 
packages i s by considering the base-case solut ion for a power system 
network. By considering the violations occurred following the base-case, 
l i n e s and units w i l l be ranked and subsequently f u l l solut ions can be 
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obtained for further inves t iga t ion . Whether one obtains the l i s t by 
considering ful l AC power-flow or by performing the f i r s t iterations of a DC 
load-flow, neither of these approaches identif ies a l l those contingencies 
which may cause out-of-limit conditions. 
Working in dependent variable spaces, Wasley and Daneshdoost'^-' 
presented a reliable technique for identifying and ranking line outages 
which result 1n the violation of various l imits related to power system 
s e c u r i t y . Security l im i ts defined in terms of real-power l ine f lows, 
generator reactive powers and demand bus voltage magnitudes were considered 
in normalised sub-spaces and c r i t i ca l contingencies identified by a 
f i l ter ing algorithm using the inf ini te norm as a performance index. 
Cr i t ica l contingencies were then ranked using Pis which were defined in 
accordance with the sub-space of interest . In the case of real-power line 
flows, ranking is based on a measure related to distance from the centre of 
the corresponding security region, whereas in the case of generator reactive 
powers and demand bus voltage magnitudes, ranking is based on measures 
related to distances from the boundaries of the corresponding regions. The 
above approach is not suitable for real-time purposes due to the execution 
time required to obtain the ranking. 
f B O 53 1 
In L J U » , ' J J i t was mentioned that the performance index in most cases 
provides a good measure for determining the severity of transmission line 
contingencies. However, in some instances, particularly when a single line 
becomes overloaded and at the same time the loading of other l ines 
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decreases, the value of the PI decreases and the overload may not be 
recognised. This pheonomenon has been termed "masking" by the authors of 
i"50 531 / 54 . \ 
references 1 ' J . I r isar r i and Sassonv ' developed an eff ic ient method 
for automatic contingency selection. Their method is based on the 
predict ion of the value of a system wide performance index for each 
transmission l ine outages and the subsequent ranking of the severity of the 
outages according to the predicted values of the PI . Although their method 
P5Q 441 
is based on the work previously reported in references, W , " J i t overcomes 
the l imi ta t ions encountered with those approaches. This was achieved 
through the eff icient implementation of the DC-load-flow based selection 
T541 
method proposed i n . J To ef f ic ient ly compute the value of the PI after a 
l ine outage, i t was shown that only one forward-backward substituting is 
required per execution of the ranking algorithm, and the storage of two 
vectors. These lines in the network, need only be updated whenever there is 
topology changes in the network configuration. 
[ 5 1 1 
The above approach provides a rel iable method for ACS. In L J , the 
authors provide means for avoiding the PI masking effect . 
Four algorithms most suitable for real-time purposes were tested and 
compared with the ranking produced by a ful l AC solution for each 
contingency, in reference L % i l - J . These were: one full iteration of the fast 
decoupled load-flow, f i rs t -ha l f iteration of DC load-flow, l ine outage 
distribution factors based on DC load-flow, sensit ivi ty analysis . It was 
concluded that from a performance viewpoint the line outage distribution 
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factors base on DC load-flow is superior. In reference L , the authors 
proposed a new alogrithm for secondary outages. The authors investigated 
the f e a s i b i l i t y of including the secondary outages of generation/load 
outages and simultaneous outages of two l ines in the overall ACS analysis. 
This approach is not eff icient for real-time Automatic Security Assessment 
of power systems due to the required execution time, however, as will be 
presented in la ter chapters, inc lus ion of secondary outages could be 
analysed by providing f a c i l i t i e s for the operator to interrupt the Automatic 
Security Assessment (ASA) and requesting what i s termed as mixed outage 
selection. Subsequent to this study ASA would resume i t s normal task. None 
of the existing algorithms investigates the contingency selection for a 
radial network or even when the outage of a single l ine could result in a 
sp l i t network, most algorithms automatically assign a high value of PI for 
the particular l ines , which in fact is not true and further the AC load-flow 
which follows the ACS ignores the l ines causing s p l i t . Hence no 
steady-state solution could be obtained, except by performing separate 
solut ions for each sub-network which i s not at present an e f f i c i e n t 
approach. 
The ACS algorithm implemented in the OCEPS package incorporates network 
is landing and i s based on the s e n s i t i v i t y of the performance index as 
in l 5 0 - 1 . i t i s most su i tab le for real - t ime secur i ty assessment. The 
algorithm is explained in the next section. 
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5.3 Line Overload Performance Index 
The method described here is based on l i n e a r i s e d load-flow ( d . c . 
load-flow), which is then known to be numerically stable and ef f ic ient . 
Here the line overload performance index is defined f i r s t . 
W 
Z P ) 
m 
W 







P , = line flow in line ' A ' 
P. - maximum capacity of l ine ' A ' 
W = a weighting factor for l ine ' z ' 
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L = total number of lines 
Alternatively, the performance index can be expressed in terms of e , the 
phase angle across line . 
W W w z e) 
m 
4=1 
W 81 1 / 








b = susceptance of l ine t 
k = P m 





t • V * <5-3> 
5.3.1 Analysis of a Single Branch Outage 
For a change in the susceptance of branch k ( i . e ; Ab^), the change in 
( i . e . the inverse of system susceptance matrix B) i s as follows: 
fix = (B + Abk n^ 7 ) " 1 - x = ( B n e w ) _ 1 -x (5.4) 
where: 
i s a Nxl incidence vector for l ine k, having 1 and -1 at the two 
elements corresponding to the sending bus and receiving bus of l ine V , and 
zeros for other elements in the vector. Note that x = B"*. 
i'581 
By the matrix inversion lamma 
6x = c^J (5.5) 
where 
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" k -Abi, 
1 + A b k x k k 
x k k = 15k a k 
(scalar) 
(scalar) 
ak = rn^ (Nxl vector) 
The corresponding change in e i s : 
(5.6) 
where: 
6 0 N = (fix P J J ) is the change in nodal phase angle. 
is the nodal power injection, 
Substituting equation (5.5) into equation (5.6) 
_ m T T D 
SjL ~ nLA n k a k otk 
= n k ( m j a*) (X !Dk>T 
• \ («LT «*> ("!kT 
p k X * k ^ (5.7) 
where: 
e N = — f - H : ~ d , c * l o a d - f l o w equat ion r e l a t i n g bus power i n j u n c t i o n 
and bus phase ang le . 
\ = ID|<T ®N i s t n e P n a s e d i f f e r e n c e across l i n e ' K ' . 
(Q) 
5 .3 .2 Change o f performance index SL^ ' due t o change o f 60^ and Ab^ -
Outage o f branch V 
From equat ion ( 5 . 2 ) 




k new ft new 
( 5 . 8 ) 
where: 
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new b . when 4*k 





0 4 + 6 0 4 
Once Z n e w (0) i s found oZ k ( 9 ) = Z n e w (e ) - Z o l d (0) can be c a l c u l a t e d 
w i t h Z o l d (0) = 
=i w v 2 [ * % p ; 
2 L 
E W 4 0 4 
( 5 . 9 ) 
s u b s t i t u t i n g b A n e w and 0 A n e w i n t o equat ion ( 5 . 8 ) 
Z n e w (0) = £ w. 
4=1 */< 
b 4 < 0 4 + aQl] 
m 
L 4 
2\ new* 2 
+ w k ( 2 b k &b k + A b k ' ) ( e ^ ' " " ) 
( P u m ) 2 
4=1 "f l l 4=1 f 9 
2 k 4 2 k 4 
= I . w , e t 2 + I . w £ 2 0 A C0, + 6 0 / + R 
2k 
Z o l d (0 ) + I W 2 T V °K XAk 0 4 + ^ i W * \ 2 0 , 
4=1 / 0 * _ i / o / o 
2 X. 2 + R 
2k, 
? ' 2 
2 K 4 2 k 4 
Z 0 l d (0 ) + 2 . 0 , I 
™ 4=1 
W, (m T a ) T 0 + 
* / o 4 k 
2 k 4 
\ Z e k 2 I WA (n>T a ) T (m T a ) +R 
1=1 / , k k 
2k * 
*• 
Z o l d (e ) + 2r^ ft \ W (m T X m ) T (m T i 
2 k / 
+ n k 2 6k 2 i \ akT " i " J °k + R 
k 2 
Z 0 l d (0 ) + Zy 0 k H m T k X (m, m / ) 
2k, 
V 0 k 2 1 , \ f \ c t %T> <^  + 
2k 
z o l d (0 ) + 2 ^ m k TX I W 
A = 1 V
 m * m * °N 
2 k / 
2 « 2 T v 
+nk 0k \ L V m * " l "k + R £=1 * / 
2K, 
Z o l d (0 ) + 2 n k 0 k m k T x (aij m 2 . . . m L ) 
' I / 
2k 
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. . Z n e w (0 ) = Z 0 l d (G) = 2r^ ^ m k T X A W 0 A T ^ 
(5 .10 ) 
+ \ 2 \ Z \ T A W 0 \ + R 
= Z o l d (0 ) + 2 ^ 0 K m k T X W ^ ^ 0 / c^ T W + R 
= Z o l d (0 ) = 2 ^ 0 , 0, + 1 ^ ^ 2 t k k + R (5 .11 ) 
where 
0 k = m k 0 N GN = X P N 
P N = W 0N N x 1 vec to r 
*kk = \ W °k 




A = (m^ nig . • • 
o / 2k 1 W / W e 2k 
O V) / 2k (5 .12 ) 
Wk ( 2b k Ab k + A b k 2 ) (Q^™)2 
R = — • 
2 ( P k m ) 2 (5 .13) 
V " \ + ° \ = ^ + X k k 
= 1 + Ab k X k k ( 5 . H ) 
P k = b k ^ aZ k (0 ) = Z n e w (0 ) - Z o l d (0 ) 
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2 2 2 2 
* 7 l n \ * k P k ° k H k ^ k P k W k P k " k A b k A b k 
6 Z k » ' = — + + — — 
b k b k 2 2 P k m A b k b k b k (5 .15) 
where l i n e V i s o u t , s b k = - b k 
. * k p k e k t k k " k 2 p k 2 W k p k 2 n k 
« z k b ) = + — _ 
b k b k 2 2 P m k b k (5 .16 ) 
Equat ion (5 .16 ) expresses the change o f performance index ( l i n e over load 
index) i n terms o f the parameters t k k , n k , P k m , w k and b k o f t he outage l i n e 
V . 
Among these parameters , t k k a n d n k needs p r e l i m i n a r y e v a l u a t i o n before 
k 
a z k $ ) can be c a l c u l a t e d . Parameters t k k and n k ( two vec to rs of l eng th L) 
a r e s t o r e d and r e c a l c u l a t e d o n l y when t h e base t o p o l o g y c h a n g e s . S ince 
topo logy changes are i n f r e q u e n t , t h i s s to rage scheme saves the c a l c u l a t i o n o f 
t k k andn k each t ime ACS i s r e q u i r e d , hence speeding up the response of the 
program. * 
5.4 Sequence o f Computation 
The c o m p u t a t i o n s t e p s o f t h e p rog ram e m p l o y i n g ACS a r e d e s c r i b e d as 
f o l l o w s : 
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1. C a l c u l a t i o n 
X = B"1 
W = A W Q A T 
^ - W % 
2. For l i n e k = 1 t o L, c a l c u l a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g 
d ) k = - b k s ca la r 
^ - X i N X I vec to r 
IR = (00..1..0.. -1.0) NXI vec to r 
p o s i t i o n p o s i t i o n 
IS IR 
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X kk = Hl^J % s ca la r 
*kk = \ * \ s c a l a r ( s t o r e d up as LXI vec to r f o r 
a l l ) 
-Ab k s c a l a r 
TV = ( s t o red up as LXI vec to r f o r 
U S 5 k T k - k a l l ) 
3 . Evaluate 6 Z k ( e ) us ing equat ion (5 .16 ) f o r a l l k, 
4 . Ranking 6Z k i n descending order accord ing t o i t s v a l u e , f o r a l l k. 
5. Ou tpu t rank ing r e s u l t s . Since 6Z^ i s an over load i n d e x , the f i r s t 
ranked cont ingency corresponds t o the most severe l i n e outage ' k ' . 
Vol tage V i o l a t i o n Performance Index 






(5 .17 ) 
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Where: 
W = a we igh t i ng f a c t o r f o r bus ' £ ' . 
= vo l tage magni ture o f bus ' A ' . 
SP s p e c i f i e d vo l tage magnitude o f bus ' i'. 
A V , = maximum a l l owab le d e v i a t i o n of vo l t age magnitude from the 
s p e c i f i e d va lue f o r bus ' A ' . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t t he vo l t age v i o l a t i o n performance increases va lue as 
more buses have vo l tage magnitude d e v i a t i o n s which exceed the maximum 
a l l owab le v a r i a t i o n . 
5 . 5 . 1 Change of Z y ( 6 Z v ) due t o changes i n vo l tages fiv"A 
I f a s i n g l e branch outage cont ingency takes p l a c e , a l l t he bus vo l tages 
of t he system would be changed ( $ V A ) . The cor responding change i n Z y can be 
de r i ved as f o l l o w s : 
Let 
new V . + 6V (5 .18 ) 
v 
o l d 
SP 2 
NB w 




NB W r 
= 1 r 4 = 1 IT 




( 5 . 2 0 ) 
S u b s t i t u t i n g equat ion ( 5 . 1 8 ) i n t o equat ion ( 5 . 2 0 ) 
NB W„ _.V + 6 V 9 - V . new y 4 T 4 4 4 
v " I 
SP 2 
f " 4 r " 4 1 U ' 4 " 4 - | 
4 = 1 T~ "~AT! 4 = 1 2 Z T 3 4 = 1 2 A V ? 
•• I NB W „ 
o l d , v 4 SP\ j . W 4 6 V 4 + I X 2 26V ( V - V O R ) + I K t 
4 = 1 2 A V / 4 4 4 A = 1 2 
z = z new _ z o l d = ( 2 ( v v SP } + v } T 










6ZV = (2(V^ - V £ S P ) + 6 V £ ) T (W b) ( 5V A ) ( 5 . 2 1 ) 
where 
(V n V 9 . . . V^g) 
( v SP v SP „ SPv 
1 ' 2 
f S P . 1 "2 
{(N1 AV2 . . . «V N B ) 
W L 
= bus we igh t i ng m a t r i x 
By i n s p e c t i o n o f equat ion (5 .21) i t i s c l e a r t h a t : 
6ZV - 6ZV < « g 
Thus 6Z„ i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e unknown v e c t o r 6 V „ . Th i s v e c t o r 6V, v i i 
represents changes i n the bus vo l tage magnitudes as a r e s u l t o f a s i n g l e l i n e 
outage con t ingency . I t remains t o de r i ve fiV i n terms o f a l i n e ou tage . 
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5.6 Ana lys is o f a s i n g l e branch outage 
5 . 6 . 1 E f f e c t o f a s i n g l e branch outage on system susceptance 
L e t _B_def ine t h e system susceptance m a t r i x , and denote the outage l i n e as 
l i n e ' k ' having s e r i e s susceptance b^ and shunt susceptance (charg ing 
capac t i ve susceptance) S^. 
The outage of l i n e V would i ncu r t h e f o l l o w i n g changes i n B_. 
B n e w = B_ + 6b M R t (5 .22 ) 
where 
M. = 0 0 1. .0 0 0 0 0 
" * 0 0 / 0 . . 0 0 -1 0 0 
t 
NB x 2 m a t r i x ( 5 .23 ) 
sending r e c e i v i n g 
bus l o c a t i o n bus l o c a t i o n 
b 
o 
k " k / 2 
" b k " S k / 2 2 x 2 m a t r i x (5 .24 ) 
Let 
X = B -1 
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then 
xnew = ( B n e w } - l 
i . e . 
X N E W = (B + 1 ^ SD V ) 
t x - 1 
By the m a t r i x i n v e r s i o n lamma (5 .18) 
,new B " 1 + B ' ^ ^ V 1 
X + X M ^ M ^ X 
where: 
= X M NB x 2 m a t r i x (5 .25 ) 
^ = - ( n + 6b x k k ) " 1 A 2 x 2 ™ t r i x (5 .26) 
n = 2 x 2 u n i t m a t r i x 1 0 
0 1 
(5 .27) 
2 x 2 m a t r i x (5 .28 ) 
w i t h Sx de f i ned as: 
6x = B k X k 0 k t (5 .29 ) 
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5 .6 .2 C a l c u l a t i o n o f 6V A 
The c a l c u l a t i o n o f 6V^ i s based on t h e decoupled r e a c t i v e power equat ion 
(5 .19 ) 
- B N E W ^ ( 5 . 3 0 ) 
Expressing 6V more e x p l i c i t l y 
6VA = - ( B ^ ) " 1 A Q A 
- X n e w A Q A 
(X + 6X) AQ 
= - X A Q £ - 6X A Q A ( 5 . 31 ) 
where AQj, i s the mismatch c a l c u l a t i o n exc lud ing the e f f e c t o f outage l i n e 
V . 
Q A S P NB 
AQA = _ + = (Sjy s ince 0 A J . - B | j cos 0 ^ ) V j ( 5 .32 ) 
V, j = l 
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where + J i s the {l, j ) t h element o f the system bus admi t tance 
m a t r i x . 
A t f i r s t s i g h t , i t m i g h t seem t h i s i s an i t e r a t i v e a l g o r i t h i m , w i t h 
c a l c u l a t i o n s i t e r a t i n g between equat ions ( 5 . 3 2 ) , ( 5 .31 ) and ( 5 . 1 8 ) , i n t h a t 
order u n t i l AQ - 0 . However, the exact s o l u t i o n f o r fiV^ i s not r e q u i r e d , but 
r a t h e r t he c o r r e c t rank ing o f SL = 6Z ( 6 V a ) . I t has been found t h a t the 
V V X* 
rank ings o f 6Z us ing fiV c a l c u l a t e d a t f u l l convergence and the rankings o f 
V ™~ At 
6W us ing 6V c a l c u l a t e d by a s i n g l e i t e r a t i o n , are p r a c t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l . 
Hence, f o r the present a p p l i c a t i o n , equat ions (5 .32 ) and ( 5 . 3 1 ) need on ly be 
c a l c u l a t e d once. 
5 .6 .3 C a l c u l a t i o n o f vo l t age phase angle 
I n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n of fiV^, t he r e a c t i v e power mismatch AQ^ i s computed 
from equat ion ( 5 . 3 2 ) . I t i s obvious t h a t t h i s i nvo l ves the c a l c u l a t i o n s o f 
and 0. i n order t o eva lua te 0 „ . = 0„ - 0,-. The phase angle across the l i n e 
connect ing l and j . 
Now d e f i n i n g 
(5 .33 ) 
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where: 
0 . i s t h e base case value known p r i o r t o the commencement o f the 
present a l g o r i t h m 
60 „ i s t h e change i n bus 1 1 ' vo l t age angle due t o the outage o f 
* l i n e V . 
R e f e r r i n g t o the d . c . l o a d - f l o w equat ion (5 .17 ) 
SP 
thus 
T h i s g i v e s the changes i n 0^ due t o changes in_X_as a r e s u l t o f outage 
l i n e ' k ' where &X i s d e f i n e d as equat ion ( 5 . 2 9 ) . 
5.7 Sequence o f Computation 
The sequence of c a l c u l a t i o n can be o u t l i n e d by t he f o l l o w i n g s teps . 
1 . Ca lcu la te susceptance B_ and i t s i nve rse X^ . 
2 . For every l i n e k = 1 t o L, c a l c u l a t e the f o l l o w i n g : 
6b "
b k" S k/2 
~ b k S k/2 2x2 
"k 
001...000 
o). . . -ooq 
location of IS. 
sending bus of 
l ine V . 
1000 NBx2 
location of IR. 
receiving bus 
line V . 
k^ 
*kk V *k 




Store for a l l k as an L x 4 matrix, 
3. For each outage line k = 1 to L calculate the following: 
(a) Update 0 
fi9A= fiXp/P = PA SP 
„ new _ . . .„ 0, - e, + fieA 
(b) Calculate sin 0.. and cos 0.. for a l l lines = 1 to L 
I J I J 
. „ .„ f n new _ new\ sin e i j = sin (0. - 0j ) 
cos ©-j j = cos (e^ew _ 0 new j 
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(c) Calculate A Q b mismatch 
Q S P N B 
= Y~— + J ( G i j s i n e i j - B i j c o s e i j ) V j 
For a l l buses 
(d) Calculate 6V£ 
« V X = - X A Q . A - 6X A Q 4 
(e) Calculate 6Z v k 
« v k • (2(V t - V / P ) • « / (WJ 
4. Rank 6Z u f o r a l l outage l i n e ' k ' in descending order of i t s 
magnitude. 
5. Output ranking results. Since 6ZvJ< is a voltage violation index, 
the f i r s t ranked contingency corresponds to the most severe line 
outage V . 
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CHAPTER 6 
NETWORK jSLANDING AND EQUIVALANC1NG 
6.1 Introduction 
Conventional techniques for the assessment of transmission network 
security normally assume that the network to be studied w i l l only be subject 
to a relatively small number of contingencies simultaneously and furthermore 
that those contingencies w i l l not sp l i t the network into islands. Should 
such a situation arise the approach is usually to restr ic t analysis to the 
largest island so created. This approach has serious disadvantages in power 
systems which are subjected to frequent major outages and f o r which 
islanding is a common occurrence. 
In interconnected systems, the results obtained from contingency 
analysis studies depend strongly on the representation of the neighbouring 
but unobservable networks. As a possible solution to this f ac t , at the 
control centre the observed system, consisting of the internal system, 
t ie - l ines and boundary nodes, is represented in i t s complete form while the 
unobservable external system is modelled by network equivalents. 
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This chapter represents a unique approach for the diakoptic solution of 
the network flow when subjected to configuration changes. 
Based on Gauss - e l imina t ion , a new method f o r obtaining network 
equivalents is presented. 
6.2 Split Network 
Security assessment analysis has evolved from load-flow techniques and 
provides a measure of system performance following the occurrence of any of 
the pre-specified set of contingencies. The selection process is normally 
implemented by an automatic contingency selection algorithm (ACS) commonly 
based on DC load-flow. The ACS ranks the outages in order of decreasing 
severity and those above a certain threshold, which w i l l not sp l i t the 
network into islands, are passed for a detailed network flow analysis. 
As the size of the network increases i t is possible to tear the network 
into subdivisions. The solution to the untorn network can be obtained from 
the solut ion to the subdivis ions. For each subdivision the theory of 
network changes can be applied and i t can be shown that the general equation 
(3.27) withholds. 
When a s p l i t network arises as a consequence of a branch outage, each 
subsystem formed w i l l independently of the others cater for the supply of 
i t s own loads i f possible. The sp l i t condition can be easily detected from 
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the application of diakoptics to network solution. 
The conventional method for simulation of branch outages which cause a 
sp l i t network 1s based on the introduction of a new reference busbar (slack) 
and redis t r ib i t ion of active power among the specified generators in each 
subsystem formed and f i n a l l y refactorisation of B' and B" matrices taking 
into account the existence of a second reference and branch outages. 
Section 6.3 of the present chapter describes a new algorithm for the 
diakoptic solution of the network flow when a s p l i t network occurs as a 
result of a branch outage. The new technique avoids the need to re-order 
and re-factorise the above matrices. I t has been tested using a range of 
networks and compared with an alternative approach in which the network 
islands are formulated and solved as separate load-flow problems. From the 
numerical results obtained i t was concluded that the new technique has 
advantages fo r application in real-time security assessment. 
(27^ 
6.3 Theory of network islanding* ' 
When a s p l i t network arises as a consequence of a branch outage, 
conventionally a new reference busbar is chosen in the island which is not 
connected to the original system. This busbar can be introduced as an input 
by the operator or automatically chosen as the busbar which had the biggest 
active generation prior to the outage. I t must be among the generators 
spec i f ied f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of active power. The drawback of such 
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approaches is the need to introduce the existence of the second reference 
and the outaged branch in (B 1 ) and (B"). In the proposed approach the new 
reference is chosen automatically, but i t s existence is not reflected in 
(B 1) and (B"), hence the new technique avoids the need to refactorise. 
6.3.1 Summary of basic algorithm for outage studies 
The application of dlakoptics to linear and non-linear networks is 
summarised: 
Assuming that VQ is known from the solution of the original linear equation: 
I (6.1) 
Where YQ represents the original admittance matrix. The new value V 
after one branch has been completed can be obtained from: 
new 
V = V -XC^V "new vo A ° o (6.2) 
where C = row vector which is null except for 
C. = +1 and C, = -1 
I J 
X ZQC is the difference of columns i and j of 1Q 
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Z„ = Y ~ stored in factored form o o 
C^)IQ = is the difference of elements i and j of VQ 
d = (1/b + (^X)" 1 a scalar factor 
b = l ine or nominal transformer series admittance. 
The above approach is fas t , accurate and avoids refactorising YQ. 
Load-flow is well known as a non-linear problem. The fast decoupled 
Newton-Raphson (FDNR) load-flow has proved fas t , su f f i c ien t ly accurate and 
rel iable. I t is already well documented in chapter 4 and therefore no 
detailed description w i l l be presented. 
The basic model is described by: 
L A S ] • [ B T 1 C A P / V ] (6.3) 
L A V ] = [ B ' T 1 L ' A Q / V ] (6.4) 
The numerical technique based on diakoptics developed for line outages 
can be applied to FDNR af ter each i terat ion process in order to obtain new 
angles and voltages: 
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Step 1: [A0 Q ] = L B ' ] " 1 [ t f / V ] 
Step 2: X' = [ B ' ] " ^ 
Step 3: 1/d' = l / b , + C lX' 
Step 4: LA9 n e w ] = [A0o'J - d' x' (6.5) 
where: b' = 1/X^ 
For voltages, similar steps to those above can be implemented and the 
new voltages are: 
= - D " X " M T A V O { 6 , 6 ) 
where: 
X" = [ B " ] ' ^ 
d" = (l/b' + cV)" 1 
b- = V^ 2 ik + x 2 i k ) 
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6.3.2 Pre-processing for system separation 
Consider Figure (3.4) which represents two islands interconnected by 
the t i e - l ine between buses i and j . The Thevenin equivalent c i rcu i t for the 
above is shown in Figure ( 3 . 5 ) . In Figure ( 3 . 5 ) , Z f t , and Z B are the 
equivalent impedances of the two islands. The impedance matrix for this 
c i rcui t is given by: 
ZA h h 
h h + I h + I 
h Z. + 1 ZB + I 
y i j 
I f now the t i e - l i ne between buses i and j is to be removed, from equati 
(6.2) we have: 
Step 1: X = ZQC 
o 
•1/y 
Step 2: I = (1/b + ^ X ) 
ci 
therefore: l / d = 0 
Hence a sp l i t network results when l / d = 0. Without further calculation by 
inspection of 'X' obtained from step 1, the buses in each island are 
ident i f ied: 
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Island 1 (with the original slack) 
Island 2 
When diakoptics is applied to FDNR, following the steps above 1/c becomes very 
small but not identically zero, and fur ther , vector 'X' would not hold 
absolute zeroes. A sensi t ivi ty factor should therefore be specified which is 
a function of the computer on which the study is implemented. 
6.3.3 Islanding 
By removing the branch between buses i and j in Figure (3.4) , the 
original network divides into two islands. The original admittance matrices 
are the following form: 
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Submatrix [Zo^j is the impedance matrix of the connected part and [Zo^] 
should be modified to obtain the impedance of the second island. In this 
work, YQ is assumed symmetrical and since the row elements in submatrix [B] 
have equal co-factors, the row elements in [ZOg] are equal. 
I f 1 j , i 2 . . . . i m represent the injections at the buses of the intact 
network, the original solution is given by: 
Vn = Z I 
O 0 0 
o r \ = z l l 1 1 + z12 1 2 + z13 h + * + z l i * j + Z1W V "+zlm \ 
V o 2 = z 21 h + z22 h + z23 *3 + *+ z 2 j *J + z2k V "+ZZm % 
\ = z i i 1 1 + z i 2 h + z i 3 1 3 + ' + Z i j 1 j + Z i k V " + Z i m \ 
Where column j , k, n, m are referred to as the buses in the second island. 
When the t i e - l i ne is removed, the solution to the connected part can be 
obtained from: 
neWj^  -\ - z l j " z l k i k 
new^ -\ " Z 2 j " Z2k i k 
new^ -\ " Z i j " Z i k i k . . . " " zim 1m 
A column in llo^j can be chosen, corresponding to the new reference 
busbar and hence equation (6.8) can be represented at: 
neW l = \ - z l r ( i j + \ + i m ) 
= v ^ 
new2 o 2 2r v j 
In matrix form the above can be repesented as: 
- CV - C l t C V C 2 t l< (6.9) 
[ V n e w J gives the solution to the connected part. 
where: 
LV 0] = U „ ] C l 0 ] 
1 1 1 1 
is zero every but ' 1 ' for the new reference busbar. Hence, C 1 t Z £ 
a column vector corresponding to the new reference busbar. 
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C 2 is zero for island 1 and ' 1 ' for island 2. I t is set when 
calculating [ x ] as in the previous section. C ^ o i s a s c a l a r factor . I f i n 
the subsystem without the original reference bus, there is no provision for 
the introduction of a new slack bus, then the reference is taken as the busbar 
of the new subsystem connnected to the outaged branch. 
The advantage of applying equation (6.9) to obtain the new solution for 
the connected network is that i t avoids refactorising. 
To obtain the solution to the subsystem without the original reference in 
parallel with the solution of the connected part, the following equation can 
be applied. 
tVnew ] = [ V " c l * C 2 t *o + C l * C2 lo ^ 
where: 
Zm = f ( z 3 , z 1 § z 2 ) 
Z l = l " r o 
Zo = f ( V ^ ^ i / C o ^ L ) y„„ is the shunt admittance connected to the c r l r l L o ro 
original reference bus. 
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r Q refers to the original reference bus and r^ refers to the new reference 
bus. 
The new technique has been applied to many linear and non-linear networks 
and shown to be e f f i c i e n t , accurate and rel iable, and most suitable for the 
real-time security assessment of electrical power networks. I t avoids the 
need to refactorise [B'T. and LB"] and furthermore, modifications to angles are 
only required after each i terat ion since PV buses are not represented in [ B " j . 
I f automatic tap changers are included in the system, the tap positions on the 
island with no reference should be set to the i n i t i a l tap positions, before 
any modifications are performed. 
6.4 Equivalencing 
One of the requirements of today's modern power system control centres is 
to determine equivalents for extensive power systems external to an internal 
system equipped with a central control computer. These equivalents are needed 
for d i f fe ren t system studies where the internal system is represented in 
de ta i l , and the external system is represented by their equivalent, to 
simulate the interaction effects of the external system on the internal system 
for disturbances originating in the internal system. 
The continuing increase in the size and complexity of electr ic power 
systems has demanded that a larger number of cases, involving far bigger 
networks, be analysed in regard to the ab i l i t y of the system to provide 
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rel iable, secure and economical service. In most cases the system of concern 
(internal) is a part of a larger interconnection of power pool. I t is rather 
impractical to analyse the entire system in applications involving local 
control of an area. To overcome this d i f f i c u l t y two approaches have evolved. 
1. To break the power system into a reasonable number of subsystems that can 
be handled separately while the interaction between the subsystems is 
accounted f o r . <»><»><75) 
2. To isolate the area of concern from the rest of the system and construct 
an equivalent that provides a f a i t h f u l means for representing the 
interconnected network beyond the boundaries of the area of concern, 
rather than providing a way to obtain the overall solution of the entire 
systen,.< 7 6>< 7 7> 
I t is thus desirable, through equivalencing, to develop a representation 
of the system outside the area of study (extended system) of as low an order 
as possible while maintaining the essential impact upon the area under study 
(internal system). I t is also required in cases of operational or real-time 
mode, that these equivalents be ident i f ied without knowledge of configuration 
and state of the external s i t e . 
The construction of the equivalents would have to depend mostly on a good 
model of the internal system and data telemetered from locations within and at 
the boundaries of the internal system. Furthermore, i t is important that the 
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equivalents be constructed in a minimal amount of time so that they can 
provide for on-line study modes. 
Extended simulations of large power systems with long transmission lines 
are needed. If such simulations are to be carried out without consuming 
unreasonable computer resources then better solution algorithms must be 
available, highly restr ict ive assumptions must be made regarding system models 
and/or the effective size of the system must somehow be reduced for solution. 
The general approach is to reduce the passive portion of the network. 
Such a reduction must provide for an accurate representation of real power 
transfer, and at the same time conserve the reactive response of the internal 
network. Basical ly , the interconnected power system is divided into internal 
and external systems, and the boundary buses are defined as shown in Figure 











Figure (6.1) Separation between local and external systems 
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The choice of the boundary buses is such that any large disturbances to 
be investigated in the internal system would have small effects on the 
external system. 
A good equivalent of the external system was suggested by Ward based 
on a generalised Norton equivalent theory where the current sources are viewed 
as constant active and reactive power sources. A similar equivalent can be 
derived using Thevenin's equivalent theory leading to constant power and 
reactive power sources behind the equivalent internal impedances at each 
boundary bus. Either of these equivalents i s a stat ic equivalent made of: 
1. Equivalent internal source admittances (or impedances) at each boundary 
bus. For a Norton equivalent these admittances are grounded; while for a 
Thevenin's equivalent source, creating a f ic t i t ious internal equivalent 
bus. 
2. Equivalent transfer admittances (or impedances) between the boundary 
buses. 
3. Equivalent power sources - their sum equals the exchange power scheduled 
to flow between the internal and external systems. 
Ward reduction is based on Gaussian elimination and has been incorporated 
in most of f - l ine and on-line equivalencing approaches, such as extended Ward 
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and simplified extended Ward. 
The Ward method suffers from poor accuracy when performing security 
analysis mainly due to problems in the designation of the boundary bus types. 
Unless a bus actually has a unit , i t i s not correct to designate i t as a PV o 
PQ bus. What i s lacking is a satisfactory way of representing the external 
system's reactive power response to changes in the study system. References 
K ' l i s t the commonly recognised d i f f i cu l t ies of the Ward approach 
experienced mostly in of f - l ine implementation. 






Figure (6.2) Ward Equivalent 
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In Figure (6 .2) , the equivalent injection for each boundary bus is given 
by: 
pi e q • v 1 ° U,i \° ( f i ik c°s V + B i k s , n V> 
" I 6 " - V 1 ° Ik.1 »k° <61k S 1 " °1k° + B i k COS 0 1 k ° ) (6.12) 
In practical applications, there are various versions and interpretations 
of the Ward method. In some cases, boundary buses are designed as their 
original types ^ 8 3 ^ , in others they are considered to be a l l PV types ^ 7 6 ^ , or 
are PQ types ( 8 ^ , whereas in others, more complicated heuristic boundary 
techniques are used 
In the extended Ward equivalent each boundary bus is designated as PV or 
PQ as i t actually i s . A new f ic t i t ious PV bus, with P =0 and Vm = V.° is ^ J ' m m l 
attached to each PQ boundary bus i , via a f ic t i t ious branch of admittance 
[Y^] , as in Figure (6 .3) . The new f ic t i t ious buses contribute no active power 
to the system and no reactive power in the base case. However, whenever the 
study system conditions change, these buses respond with the supply or 
absorption of reactive power. These can be eliminated altogether i f desired 
by placing an additional injection ^ 8 3 ^: 
AP + jAO = (E. E m * - V ^ ) . Y . * (6.13) 
at each relevant boundary bus. 
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If Y. i s susceptive equation (6.13) simplifies to: 
AQ - V . ( V . - v i ° ) . Y i (6.14) 
INTERNAL 
SYSTEM 





Pm = o m 
V m = V , m l 
Fict i t ious 
Buses 
Figure (6.3) Extended Ward Equivalent 
If in the extended Ward equivalent method the resistances in the external 
system be ignored, this gives view to simplified extended Ward equivalent. 
Though, this method does not provide suff icient accuracy, i t guarantees good 
X/R ratio in the equivalent network; and the process can be performed more 
economically on a rea l , rather than, complex matrix. 
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The reduction technique can be directly applied to fast decoupled 
load-flow which is used extensively in system security assessment. Basical ly , 
the reduction process can be applied to [B'!l and [B"] matrices to obtain B'eq 
and B"eq and the equivalent injections at boundary buses are computed from 
(6.11) and (6.12) using the admittances j B ' ^ 6 0 1 and j B " i k e q respectively for 
the equivalent branches Then in decoupled load flow solutions, [ B 1 ^ ] 
and L B " e q ] becomes incorporated into the internal system [B'3 and [B"J 
matrices. The equivalent branches susceptances contained in [ B , e q ] and [ B " e q ] 
are used in computing [ A P / V ] and [ A Q / V ] . The decoupled equivalent retains the 
advantages of the simplified extended Ward equivalent, however, i t requires 
the storage of two separate susceptive equivalent networks. 
From the survey done based on a l l the above techniques, i t was concluded 
that the extended Ward version is the most accurate ( 8 3 ) . The simplied 
extended Ward method is the next most accurate. This and the decoupled 
versions sacr i f ice a l i t t l e accuracy for certain computational advantages. 
The non-decoupled versions can be used with any load-flow algorithm. 
The method presented in section 6.5, uses Gauss elimination to perform 
reduction of the passive external network and is an extension to the extended 
Ward. It provides accurate and reliable resul ts . 
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6.5 External network equivalehcihg 
As mentioned in the previous section, the extended Ward method of 
reduction provides the most accurate and reliable results. In this method, 
following a reduction on the passive external network, equivalent branches 
wil l be introduced which connect the boundary buses. In addition, f ic t i t ious 
buses and f ic t i t ious admittances connecting the f ict i t ious buses to the 
boundary buses wil l be introduced as shown in Figure (6.3) . 
The f ic t i t ious buses can be removed i f equivalent injections calculated 
and added to that at the boundary buses. It was decided to use the Gauss 
elimination as the basis for the reduction process (see 3.2) . In the new 
approach however, the reduction is not solely performed on the external 
passive network. Basical ly , from the solution to the original network 
(external + internal ) , the injections (Generation-load) at each bus which is 
to be reduced wi l l be replaced by i t s equivalent admittance, except for the 
boundary buses. Hence, the external network wil l be transformed into a 
passive network. At this stage following the rules of Gauss elimination (see 
3.2), the equivalent admittances wil l be obtained. However, the shunt 
admittances calculated in the reduction process, which are connected to the 
boundary buses wi l l contribute to the system losses when performing load-flow 
on the reduced network. Hence, once the equivalent shunt admittances are 
obtained, these wil l be replaced by fixed injections, which in terms are added 
to the original injections at the boundary buses. Figure (6.4) i l lustrates 
the steps taken for obtaining solutions to a reduced network. 
160 
The advantage of this approach is that a l l the non-linear loads in the 
external network can be well represented in the reduction process. To obtain 
accurate reactive responses, bus matching is performed at the slack bus i . e . 
keep the active and reactive generation at slack bus constant. This approach 
was tested on a number of networks and provided accurate results as in 
extended Ward technique. It i s more suitable for power flow analysis, since 
the contribution of shunt admittances at the f ic t i t ious buses are eliminated 
and in addition the non-linear loads can be more accurately modelled. 
Following the reduction process, in order to obtain a better convergence, 
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7.1 Introduction to Real-time EMS Integration 
The extensive growth of interconnected power systems together with the 
operational complexities and the requirement for improved system management, 
has led to a greater dependence on automatic control at a l l l eve ls of 
operation and the need for control systems with complex real-time functions. 
Typical ly an integrated control system consists of two basic 
components; Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) function and 
power system applications function. These functions impose dist inct ly 
different processing requirements on the computers in which they 
operate.'- 7 0^ 
The power system application's function requires mostly a high speed 
heavy numerical calculation environment which is best handled by a powerful 
floating point processor and large arrays of contiguous, random access 
memory. This requirement i s generated by such functions as production 
planning and power network security analysis . The recent inclusion of 
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operator training simulators imposes an even heavier calculation load on the 
processors. 
Two conceptually different hardware configurations have been developed 
to handle the processing requirement of an EMS; Centralised Systems and 
T311 
Distributed Processing Systems. J 
Centralised systems consist of a main computer or computers which 
handle a l l of the EMS functions. Generally, a l l of the processors in a 
Centralised System have to handle both SCADA heavy interrupt load and power 
systems numerical calculations. Distributed processing systems contain 
multiple processing l eve ls where each level i s assigned to a s p e c i f i c 
machine or set of machines which are optimised for the individual 
requirements, that i s , SCADA heavy interrupt loads and power system 
numerical calculations can be sp l i t into different types of machine. 
Throughout the evaluation of SCADA systems, attempts have been made to 
use distributed processing architectures. These experiments have not been 
totally successful due to the lack of appropriate technology. But, in 
recent years, the trend toward broad and diversif ied processing requirements 
of u t i l i t i e s has created an even stronger need for the development of 
effective distributed architecture. As electr ical networks grow and become 
more complex, operators need more sophisticated tools to control them. The 
1721 
technology to distribute the EMS functions is now available. 
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Due to the nature of power systems, the information management system 
is usually hierarchical with data passing from the substations and 
generating stat ions through area control centres up to the top of the 
hierarchy, where global functions such as generation control and network 
analysis are performed. The downward flow of t ra f f ic from system control 
centres to substations and generating stations is much less in volume than 
the upward flow and contains the operator commands and system co-ordinating 
and optimisation controls. The power system application functions normally 
divide into two areas of real - t ime and study. The real - t ime set run 
automatically on a cyc l ic basis or on a power system event. 
EMS has three major sources of data; telemetered data, network 
parameters and generation parameters. Conventionally the databases in the 
system are built using the f a c i l i t i e s of a Database Manager and database 
compiler, which are s p e c i f i c to individual appl icat ion a r e a . ^ - ' The 
defined databases each form a logical independent description, from which 
any appl icat ion may draw the required data . For example the network 
database describes the power network and supports a l l the network 
appl icat ions such as power flow, and state est imator , the generation 
database describes the generation characteristics and data and supports the 
generation applications such as AGC, SCADA database for analog and status 
obtained from RTUs. The correspondence between the different databases is 
also built in an off - l ine mode but updated in real-time i f necessary. 
During the integrated operation of the system many aspects of the 
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operation of the system and performance of the individual algorithms are 
dynamically tested using the simulation f a c i l i t i e s . The job of managing and 
integrating an EMS system is large and complex and requires good software 
support tools. Once the integration phase i s accomplished the performance 
of the system as a whole (SCADA and EMS) i s tested. ' - 7 2 - ' 
7.2 OCEPS EMS Software Integration 
Large scale systems of which a power system is a prime example, i s an 
area in which a wide gap exists between theoretical mathematically based 
research and engineering practice. The research programme at Durham is 
directed towards bridging this gap by linking some of the available and new 
theoretical techniques with the practical requirements of on-line computer 
control in power systems. 
Testing and validation of analysis and control software is achieved 
with the aid of a real-time simulation system developed at Durham 
University. In this way the performance of Energy Management software can 
be evaluated against a rea l i s t i c model of the network under a range of 
operating conditions. A secondary benefit of the integrated simulation, 
measurement and control software is the abi l i ty to provide a useful operator 
training a id , which includes power system dynamics, telemetering and energy 
f 3 | 
management f a c i l i t i e s . J 
The energy management suite OCEPs developed at Durham divides the 
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operational control of electr ical power systems into two major functions; 
simulation function and control function. Further, as shown 1n Figure 
(1.10) each function comprises of a number of tasks executed in the manner 
shown. The simulation and control algorithms can either be executed on a 
single Perkin-Elmer 3230 computer main frame using multi-tasking operation 
system or the simulation function can be executed on a dedicated 
Perkin-Elmer 3230 with simulated telemetry and control information 
transmitted s e r i a l l y to a separate control computer. In general the 
simulation imposes the major computational load on the system, special 
multi-microprocessor hardware is being developed to allow real-time response 
with large systems. 
OCEPS security analysis subsystem is divided into the following 
modules: AUTomatic OUTage selection (AUTOUT), SECurity Assessment program 
(SECASS), manual OUTAGE selection (OUTAGE), and SECurity assessment OUTput 
program (SECOUT). In the remaining sections of this chapter numerical 
results obtained during the course of this research together with the ful l 
integration of the security subsystem to the OCEPS suite are presented. 
A technical paper was published based on the network islanding 
1*271 
technique developed during the course of research at Durham. J 
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7.3 Numerical Results 
7.3.1 Test Network 
The test network is i l lustrated in Figure (7.1) and the associated 
network data i s given in Appendix 3. The Universi ty of Durham OCEPS 
project thirty substation test systems, as the name suggests, includes 30 
substat ions . This network i s bus and node or ientated. Each bus in a 
substation is connected via links to other buses in the same substation. By 
switching operations the number of electr ical nodes in a substation can 
vary. The above network is composed of 72 buses, 41 branches of which 7 are 
transfomers (which include f ixed tap, automatic tap changer and phase 
shifter transformers), 23 loads, 6 generators and 2 shunts. 
Outage of transmission lines 16, 13 or 34 wil l sp l i t the above network 
and hence the contingency selection algorithm gives them the lowest rank 
( i . e . most harmful). 
Network topology changes can be achieved by opening or closing 
appropriate breakers in the system. The above process (scenario) can also 
be achieved via a prespeci f ied program. Hence l i n e s , u n i t s , loads, 
transformers, shunts, nodes and buses may be removed or added to the 
network. The above operation is executed by the system manager via an 
interactive program. 
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Protection is an inherent part of the simulator and as a result of an 
overload, the simulator will t r ip the appropriate breaker and hence a l ine 
or equipment may be taken out of service automatically. 
7.3.2 Automatic Contingency Selection (ACS) 
The ACS problem is concerned with developing computer algorithms for 
quickly identifying those contingencies which may cause out-of-limit 
conditions so as to reduce the number of contingencies that need to be 
evaluated when assessing the power system's security in a Real-time 
envi ronment. 
Most of the existing ACS procedures are based on l ine over load limit 
violat ions, where the Performance Index (PI) i s expressed as a function of 
f C Q K I T 
normalised l ine flows and the use of DC load flow equations.1- ' J The 
voltage limit violations are included by calculating the voltage changes 
from the linearised load flow equations.'- 5 2-' All these methods are useful 
for analysing single branch outage only. 
In Chapter 5, the techniques commonly used for forecasting the PI and 
the development of ACS algorithms were compared. Four algorithms most 
suitable for Real-time purposes were tested and compared with the ranking 
T571 
produced by a ful l A.C. solution for each contingency. J These were: one 
ful l iteration of the fast decoupled load flow, f i r s t half iteration of DC 
load flow, l i n e outage d is t r ibut ion factors based on DC load flow and 
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f i n a l l y an algorithm based on sensi t ivi ty analysis. In the above reference, 
i t was concluded that from a performance view point the l ine outage 
distr ibution factors based on DC load flow is superior. 
Two algorithms have been implemented in OCEPS for ranking l ine outages 
in terms of their impact on the real power flows throughout the network, and 
according to their impact on the bus voltages. The essential components 
needed in developing each algorithm (as described in Chapter 5) are: a 
scalar performance index (PI) for ranking the contingencies and a 
computationally e f f i c i en t method for evaluating the PI for each 
187 881 contingency.1- * J 
The ACS algorithm developed in Chapter 5 has been applied to IEEE 30 
bus test network. The results of ACS-were compared with the f u l l A.C. load 
flow rankings obtained by considering each outage case in turn . 
Figure (7.2) i l lus t ra tes the ACS for l ine over load contingencies. I t 
can be seen that the ACS ranking is very similar to the f u l l A.C. load flow 
ranking. All the top 10 contingencies, have been ident i f ied correctly by 
the ACS. Considering the top 20 contingencies, 18 of the A.C. rankings are 
included, however, l ine 30 and 37 outages are not included. Instead less 
severe lines 12 and 35 outages are included. The ACS is nevertheless shown 
to be entirely satisfactory for most operational purposes. 
The voltage violation ACS algorithm discussed in Chapter 5 was then 
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applied to the test network. The results are compared with the f u l l A.C. 
load flow rankings obtained from a complete load flow for each l ine outage 
with performance index PI evaluated using bus voltage magnitudes (see Figure 
7.3). I t can be seen that the detailed A.C. load flow ranking p ro f i l e is 
very s imi la r to the voltage v i o l a t i o n ACS ranking. In the top 10 
contingencies only line 41 is missed by ACS. For the top 20 contingency 
cases, 16 A.C. rankings are included, but lines 4, 7, 28 and 33 are missed 
out where as the less severe lines 8, 10, 12 and 19 are included. 
Detailed studies of voltage magnitudes showed that only l ine 36 outage 
involved voltage v i o l a t i o n . This l i n e has already been ranked by the 
voltage violation ACS. Voltage violation ACS consequently proved to be 
e f f i c i en t and satisfactory fo r operational purposes. 
The above results confirm the findings in references 50, 53 and 57. 
Table (7.1) presents the over load and voltage contingency l i s t s 
obtained when the above techniques were applied to the 30 bus test network. 
In table (7.1) , the f i r s t column 'RANK' gives the contingency p r i o r i t y . 
Those with the lower rank have the highest p r io r i ty for f u l l A.C. solution. 
The few at the top of the l i s t s (blinking on the terminal screen) are the 
most c r i t i c a l contingencies and are those which could s p l i t the network 
(lines 13, 15 and 34 as in Figure (7 .1 ) ) . Further, information about the 
islands, bus and substation names are provided. 
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The results obtained from f u l l A.C. power flow solutions (for 
individual line outages) are shown in tables (7.2 to 7.5). The f u l l A.C. 
solutions confirmed that the only contingency which could cause voltage and 
power violations was l ine 36, which was already in the ACS l i s t s . 
The ACS algorithm was enhanced to provide the contingency l i s t s for 
multiple islands. I f due to topological changes, the system is sp l i t into 
mul t ip le is lands , the ACS w i l l provide the contingency l i s t s f o r the 
multiple islands in paral le l . Before building the system admittance matrix, 
the program auotmatically assigns references in the islands without the 
original system reference. The advantage of this approach is that there is 
no need f o r re-order and r e - f ac to r i s a t i on of matrices and hence less 
computations. Table (7.6) provides the ACS results when the o r ig ina l 
network was s p l i t into two islands. 
To simulate the above case, lines 33, 10, 41 in Figure (7.1) were 
removed out of service prior to the ACS solution. 
The column 'ISLAND' in Table (7.6) gives the island number for each 
branch. From the results shown in this table, i t can be seen that i f l ine 
37, rank 8 in island 2 is to be completed, i t could be more harmful than 
l ine 5 rank 9 in island 1, as far as abnormal voltage contingency l i s t is 
concerned. These informations are v i ta l to the secure operation of the 
power system. 
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The information provided by the ACS 1s also very valuable for the 
system operators and engineers who monitor the system and evaluate i t s 
securi ty con t inua l ly . The system engineers are normally involved in 
performing a large number of power flows in order to obtain the answers to a 
huge number of 'what i f situations. The ACS by far reduces the 
computational e f for ts because i t highlights the most c r i t i c a l contingencies 
and ranks them accordingly. 
ACS is now an important tool in the contingency analysis subsystem of 
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FIGURE (7.1) UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
OCEPS THIRTY SUBSTATION TEST SYSTEM 
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Automatic Contingency Selection of Line Overload 
\ 
Note: Outage of 
Line 13,16 and 34 
split the system. 
They are excluded 
from the analysis. 
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FIGURE (7.2) ACS RESULTS FOR OVERLOAD CONTINGENCIES 
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FIGURE (7 .3) ACS RESULTS FOR VOLTAGE VIOLATION CONTINGENCIES 
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OCEPS OUTAGE INPROGRESS R3.0.0 
THE MOST RECENT LISTS 
RANK 
OVERLOAD CONTINGENCY 
LINE ISLAND BUS SUB 
1 13 1 25-36 9-11 
2 16 1 38-39 12-13 
3 34 1 55-56 25-26 
4 36 1 63-61 28-27 
5 19 1 37-45 12-16 
6 20 1 40-42 14-15 
7 29 1 50-51 21-22 
8 33 1 53-55 24-25 
9 32 1 52-54 23-24 
10 12 1 10-34 6-10 
11 22 1 43-47 15-18 
12 11 1 11-25 6-9 
13 30 1 41-52 15-23 
14 17 1 37-40 12-14 
15 23 1 47-48 18-19 
16 2 1 1-4 1-3 
17 28 1 30-51 10-22 
18 6 1 2-12 2-6 
19 15 1 5-38 4-12 




RANK LINE ISLAND BUS SUB 
1 13 1 25-36 9-11 
2 16 1 38-39 12-13 
3 34 1 55-56 25-26 
4 36 1 63-61 28-27 
5 14 1 25-35 9-10 
6 15 1 5-38 4-12 
7 5 1 3-9 2-5 
8 25 1 33-49 10-20 
9 26 1 26-46 10-17 
10 31 1 51-54 22-24 
11 24 1 48-49 19-20 
12 4 1 4-5 3-4 
13 37 1 59-66 27-29 
14 9 1 12-16 6-7 
15 35 1 55-62 25-27 
16 38 1 60-71 27-30 
17 18 1 37-44 12-15 
18 27 1 29-50 10-21 
19 41 1 15-63 6-28 
20 2 1 1-4 1-3 
CONTINGENCY LISTS 
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OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 08/02/1985 00:26:11 
SUMMARY OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
VOLTAGE VIOLATION REPORT 
LINE OUT FROM BUS-SUB TO BUS--SUB AT BUS-SUB VOLTAGE(PU) LIMIT (PU) 
36 63- 28 61 - 27 56- 26 0.89362 0.90000 
36 63- 28 61 - 27 60- 27 0.88910 0.90000 
36 63- 28 61 - 27 65- 29 0.87148 0.90000 
36 63- 28 61 - 27 73- 30 0.86162 0.90000 
POWER VIOLATIONS REPORT 
LINE OUT FOR LINE FROM BUS-SUB TO BUS-SUB POWER (MW) LIMIT (MW) 
36 31 51 - 22 54- 24 16.17978 16.00000 
TABLE (7.2) SECURITY ASSESSMENT VOLTAGE AND 
POWER VIOLATION REPORTS 
OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 08/02/1985 00:26:34 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY THIS IS THE MOST RECENT LIST 
**TASK USESE COMBINED OVERLOAD AND VOLTAGE LIST** 
RANK LINE BUS SUB OVERLOAD UNDERVOLTAGE OVERVOLTAGE 
1 36 63-61 28-27 Y Y N 
2 7 6-14 4- 6 N N N 
3 14 25-35 9-10 N N N 
4 12 10-34 6-10 N N N 
5 37 59-66 27-29 N N N 
6 33 53-55 24-25 N N N 
7 38 60-71 27-30 N N N 
8 20 40-42 14-15 N N N 
9 30 41-52 15-23 N N N 
10 32 52-54 23-24 N N N 
TABLE (7.3) SECURITY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
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OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 08/02/1985 00:26:34 
LINE FLOW REPORT FOR THE OUTAGE OF LINE 36 ** RANK 1 CONTINGENCY** 
LINE BUS SUB LIMIT FLOW LINE BUS SUB LIMIT FLOW 
1 1- 3 1- 2 130.00 32.69 2 1- 4 1- 3 130.00 19.30 
3 2- 6 2- 4 65.00 13.82 4 4- 5 3- 4 130.00 17.18 
5 3- 9 2- 5 130.00 34.58 6 2-12 2- 6 100.00 13.71 
7 6-14 4- 6 90.00 0.07 8 7-16 5- 7 70.00 -13.68 
9 12-16 6- 7 130.00 32.16 10 13-18 6- 8 32.00 -20.25 
11 11-25 6- 9 65.00 -2.70 12 10-34 6-10 32.00 7.92 
13 25-36 9-11 65.00 -47.78 14 25-35 9-10 65.00 45.09 
15 5-38 4-12 65.00 24.61 16 38-39 12-13 65.00 -7.59 
17 37-40 12-14 32.00 6.64 18 37-44 12-15 32.00 14.35 
19 37-45 12-16 32.00 2.06 20 40-42 14-15 16.00 1.57 
21 45-46 16-17 16.00 -0.91 22 43-47 15-18 16.00 2.23 
23 47-48 18-19 16.00 -0.41 24 48-49 19-20 32.00 -7.86 
25 33-49 10-20 32.00 9.72 26 26-46 10-17 32.00 8.07 
27 29-50 10-21 32.00 19.46 28 30-51 10-22 32.00 10.63 
29 50-51 21-22 32.00 5.64 30 41-52 15-23 16.00 6.87 
31 51-54 22-24 16.00 16.18 32 52-54 23-24 16.00 4.21 
33 53-55 24-25 16.00 13.31 34 55-56 25-26 16.00 2.70 
35 55-62 25-27 16.00 10.19 36 63-61 28-27 65.00 0.00 
37 59-66 27-29 16.00 4.67 38 60-71 27-30 16.00 5.31 
39 65-73 29-30 16.00 2.74 40 24-63 8-23 32.00 3.12 
41 15-63 6-28 32.00 -3.17 
TABLE (7.4) SECURITY ASSESSMENT LINE FLOW REPORT FOR 
OUTAGE OF BRANCH 36 
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OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENTS RESULTS 08/02/1985 00:26:34 
VOLTAGE REPORT FOR THE OUTAGE OF LINE 36 ** RANK 1 CONTINGENCY** 
BUS SUB HIGH LOW VOLTAGE BUS SUB HIGH LOW VOLTAGE 
1 1 1.100 0.900 1.061 2 2 1.100 0.900 1.047 
4 3 1.100 0.900 1.934 5 4 1.100 0.900 1.028 
7 5 1.100 0.900 1.012 10 6 1.100 0.900 1.021 
16 7 1.100 0.900 1.011 17 8 1.100 0.900 1.011 
25 9 1.100 0.900 1.023 26 10 1.100 0.900 0.998 
36 11 1.100 0.900 1.080 37 12 1.100 0.900 1.027 
39 13 1.100 0.900 1.070 40 41 1.100 0.900 1.010 
41 15 1.100 0.900 1.002 45 16 1.100 0.900 1.009 
46 17 1.100 0.900 0.997 47 18 1.100 0.900 0.991 
48 19 1.100 0.900 0.987 49 20 1.100 0.900 0.989 
50 21 1.100 0.900 0.984 51 22 1.100 0.900 0.983 
52 23 1.100 0.900 0.979 53 24 1.100 0.900 0.955 
55 25 1.100 0.900 0.909 56 26 1.100 0.900 0.894 
57 27 1.100 0.900 0.889 63 28 1.100 0.900 1.020 
64 29 1.100 0.900 0.871 69 30 1.100 0.900 0.862 
TABLE (7.5) SECURITY ASSESSMENT VOLTAGE REPORT FOR THE 
OUTAGE OF BRANCH 36 
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OCEPS OUTAGE IN PROGRESS 
THE MOST RECENT LISTS 
OVERLOAD CONTINGENCY 
RANK LINE ISLAND BUS 
1 33 2 63-61 
2 40 2 24-63 
3 35 2 55-62 
4 34 2 55-56 
5 16 1 38-39 
6 13 1 25-36 
7 32 1 52-54 
8 30 1 41-52 
9 18 1 37-44 
10 20 1 40-42 
11 19 1 37-45 
12 23 1 47-48 
13 24 1 48-49 
14 22 1 43-47 
15 11 1 11-25 
16 31 1 51-54 
17 29 1 50-51 
18 15 1 5-38 
19 27 1 59-66 
20 39 2 65-73 
SUB RANK LINE 
28-27 1 36 
8-28 2 40 
25-27 3 35 
25-26 4 34 
12-13 5 16 
9-11 6 13 
23-24 7 26 
15-23 8 37 
12-15 9 5 
14-15 10 15 
12-16 11 14 
18-19 12 18 
19-20 13 31 
15-18 14 4 
6-9 15 24 
22-24 16 6 
21-22 17 9 
4-12 18 2 
27-29 19 38 
29-30 20 27 
10/04/1985 01:27:17 
VOLTAGE CONTINGENCY 
ISLAND BUS SUB 
2 63-61 28-27 
2 24-63 8-28 
2 55-62 25-27 















2 60-71 27-30 
1 29-50 10-21 
TABLE (7.6) CONTINGENCY LISTS 
(NETWORK SPLIT INTO 2 ISLANDS) 
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7.3.3 AC Security Assessment (SECASS) 
The formulation of a mathematical model of a transmission network is a 
pre-requisite for power systems analysis and control by d ig i ta l computer. 
I f the Interconnections of the n buses of the system, the appropriate model 
of lines and transformers, and nodal inject ion data are known, a load flow 
solution gives a l l the unknown voltages, power injections and l ine flows. 
Mathematically the problem is one of solving a set of simultaneous 
[2211321 
non-linear algebraic equations. J L • 
The analysis of securi ty assessment has evolved from load f low 
techniques and is best thought of as a measure of satisfactory performance 
of the system following the occurrence of any one of a pre-specified set of 
contingencies. 
Three numerical methods have commonly been applied to the solution of 
the load flow problem: the Gauss-Seidal method, the Newton-Raphson method 
and the Fast Decoupled Newton method. 
Gauss-Seidal algorithm is ine f f i c ien t for large networks. The Fast 
Decoupled load flow method shares many of the properties of the sparse 
Newton-Raphson approach and has the further advantage of a reduction in 
computer time and memory loading. This is achieved by neglecting the 
(weak) coupling effects between phase angles and reactive power and between 
voltage magnitudes and active power. J 
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The Fast Decoupled method i s recommended f o r appl icat ion to the 
i 321 
majority of power system networks. J However in cases with very high 
resistance to reactance rat io lines (R/X), as in low voltage distr ibution 
networks, i t is beneficial to resort to the Newton-Raphson method. 
Given a l i s t of hypothetical plant outages assembled either manually 
or automatically (by the ACS algorithm), i t is necessary to execute a 
series of AC load flow studies to determine whether any l i m i t violations 
would result from the occurrence of an outage. In order to achieve more 
rapid solutions where a l i s t of similar networks must be analysed, the Fast 
Decoupled algorithm has been revised to include the method of modified 
matrices (Diakoptics). This techinque allows solutions for single or 
mul t ip le branch outages to be obtained without the need f o r matrix 
refactorisation when sparsity techniques are applied (see Figure 7.5). 
For contingency studies, two methods of approach were considered: 
( i ) Repeat load flow solution 
( i i ) Application of the recursive Diakoptics method as explained in 
Chapter 4. 
Figures (7.4) and (7.5) represent the above solution methods based on 




• ITER = ITER +1 
Find F ( X ^ ) 
Find F U 2 r ) 
X / * 1 - B ' " 1 F ( X ^ ) 
x 2 r + 1 = B " " 1 F ( x 2 r ) 
^ Check convergence ^ > 
Y 
OUTPUT RESULTS 
FIGURE (7.4) LOAD FLOW SOLUTION 
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INPUT or ig ina l network data 
also set X , R , X ? R 
I 
-> order 
f ac to r i se 
—> ITER = ITER +1 
Find F ( X ^ ) 
Find F ( X 2 R ) 
X ^ * 1 = B ' " 1 F ( X ^ ) 







load f low Diakoptics 
Input data f o r modified 
network 
Also set X , \ X . / 
OUTAGES INPUT 
1 
ITER = ITER +1 
Find F ( X / ) 
Find F ( X 2 ) 
X L
R + 1 = B M F ( X X R ) 
apply Diakoptics method to 
modify X . R + 1 
r+1 B " _ 1 F ( X 2 R ) 
N 
apply Diakoptics method to 
modify X 2 R + 1 
Check convergence 
OUTPUT RESULTS 
FIGURE ( 7 . 5 ) FLOW DIAGRAM FOR CONTINGENCY STUDIES 
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As can be seen from the f low diagram of Figure ( 7 . 5 ) , when applying 
the Oiakoptics technique there i s no need f o r re-ordering and 
r e - f a c t o r i s i n g B' and B". The t o t a l execution times required f o r the two 
methods of approach are compared i n table (7.7) based on the 30 bus test 
network and mul t ip le branch outages. 
From the results presented i t can be seen that the Oiakoptics approach 
provides the same degree of accuracy as the conventional Fast Decoupled 
Newton-Raphson method. However, when the number of simultaneous branch 
outages exceeds three, the Fast Decoupled Newton-Raphson method is f a s t e r . 
I'32l 
The above resul ts confirmed the f ind ings of Stot t and Alsac L J and 
provided the basis f o r f u r t h e r development of the Diakoptics technique i n 
order to obtain network solutions when network s p l i t s occur as a resul t of 
l'27"l 
a branch outage. J 
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30 BUS TEST NETWORK 
LOAD FLOW DIAKOPTIC 
Time (sec) No. of i t e r a t ions Time (sec) No. of i t e ra t ions 
Base solut ion 1.101 6 1.101 6 
Base solut ion + 
single outage 2.061 8 1.903 
Base solut ion + 
double outage 2.092 9 2.073 
Base solut ion + 
t r i p l e outage 2.090 9 2.124 9 
Base solut ion + 
5th outage 2.135 12 2.805 12 
TABLE (7.7) COMPARISON OF RESULTS BASED ON PERKIN-ELMER 3230 
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7.3.4 Islanding 
I n Figure ( 7 . 6 ) i f the l i n e shown w i t h an a s t e r i s k (*) i s t o be 
completed, then the network s p l i t s i n to two is lands. The conventional 
approach to obtain the so lu t ion to t h i s network i s to r e s t r i c t the solut ion 
to the largest is land created. This approach has serious disadvantages in 
power systems which are subjected to frequent major outages and f o r which 
is landing is a common occurrence. 
The common method to solve the above problem i s by solving two separate 
power f lows , one f o r each is land created. The disadvantage of t h i s approach 
i s that i t requires the formation of B' and B" matrices f o r each is land i n 
tu rn and then t o execute two solut ions . In add i t ion , as a f i r s t step to 
i d e n t i f y which buses, branches, loads e tc . belong to which i s l a n d , the input 
data stage requires a considerable amount of data processing. 
The theory of network changes (Diakoptics) as commonly applied to the 
load f l o w could not be used d i r e c t l y t o ob ta in the s o l u t i o n t o the 
indiv idual is lands. The reason is because during the Diakoptics solut ion a 
scalar becomes zero when network s p l i t takes place and hence numerically the 
inverse of t h i s scalar i s not obtainable (please re fer to Chapter 5 ) . 
The new technique developed during the course of research at Durham, 
overcomes the above problem. 
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As mentioned e a r l i e r the new technique i s based on the appl icat ion of 
Diakoptics to Fast Decoupled Newton-Raphson, and hence i t i nhe r i t s a l l the 
associated advantages. 
During the development of t h i s new method, i t was real ised that as a 
resul t of one simple mathematical operation, buses, branches etc . i n each 
island w i l l be easi ly i d e n t i f i e d (please re fe r to chapter 5 ) . 
Tables (7.8) and (7.9) provide the comparison of resul ts obtained using 
the new approach based on Diakoptics, and separate power f low solu t ions , 
when the network i n Figure (7.6) was s p l i t due to completion of the branch 
shown with an as ter isk . 
The results confirmed that the so lu t ion accuracy was s imi la r to Fast 
Decoupled method, however, the speed of execution was improved by more than 
50%. As the size of networks grow, the advantages of u t i l i s i n g the proposed 
technique became more obvious. 
In rea l - t ime , topology processing i s usually included i n the state 
estimation package in order to construct network connect ivi ty based on the 
telemetry. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the elements i n each is land ( i f is landing 
occurs) requires a large number of data processing act ions. The new method 
presented in Chapter 5 reduces the required execution time by a large amount 
and i n addi t ion has the advantage of being simple to implement. 
n r m c F I G U R E ( 7 * 6 ) UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
OCEPS THIRTY SUBSTATION TEST SYSTEM 
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NO. OF COMPACTING SOLUTION TOTAL 
ITERATIONS ORDERING TIME TIME 
FACTORISING Tl (sec) T2 (sec) 
ISLAND 1 
wi th o r ig ina l 
slack 




















































TABLE (7.9) COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
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7.3.5 Outages Selection (OUTAGE) 
The OUTAGE program allows the operator to ed i t the contingency l i s t 
provided i n advance by the ACS algorithm (AUTOUT program). In addit ion 
OUTAGE program provides f a c i l i t i e s f o r requesting simultaneous outages of 
branches, shunts, loads and generators output. 
The operator can request mixed outages of the above components. As an 
example, he can request the fo l lowing scenario: simultaneous outage of l ines 
A and B, addit ion of l ines C and D ( i f they are already out of se rv ice) , 
reduction of loads E and F ( i n per-uni t or percent) , and s i m i l a r l y f o r a few 
generator outputs. 
With respect to u n i t s , the operator 's request should be wi th in the 
capabi l i ty l i m i t s of ind iv idua l u n i t ' s output, otherwise appropriate alarm 
messages w i l l be issued. Loss of u n i t ' s outputs w i l l be red is t r ibu ted 
amongst the other units only i f the "unexpected" option i s used. I f the 
reduction in un i t outputs are "expected" (according to a defined schedule), 
then the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l not take place. 
Loads and uni ts are ranked wi th respect to t h e i r MW/MVAR l eve l s . Table 
(7.10) i l l u s t r a t e s the resul ts f o r the case when the output of uni t 2 was 
unexpectedly increased by 0.1 per u n i t . As can be seen, the output of other 
uni ts decreased. The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s done by applying the pa r t i c ipa t i on 
factors f o r the uni ts calculated by the economic despatch program. Table 
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(7.11) provides the MW, MVAR ranks f o r loads i n the system. Following a 
load r educ t ion ( i n per u n i t or pe rcen tage) , the loss i s r e d i s t r i b u t e d 
amongst the u n i t s . 
The outage program i s i n e f f e c t the in te r face between the operator and 
the securi ty package. Once the operator selects an outage scenario, via the 
f a c i l i t i e s provided by the OUTAGE program, he can send a message t o the 
SECASS program and request a f u l l AC analysis . During t h i s t r a n s i t i o n 
AUTOUT w i l l be paused temporari ly , SECASS stops i t s current execution and 
performs the study f o r the operator. At the completion of the analysis a 
message w i l l be sent d i r e c t l y from SECASS to OUTAGE to inform the user that 
the study i s f i n i s h e d . 
Once the results are ava i l ab le , the operator can invest igate them by 
inspecting various displays which w i l l be made available to him by the 
OUTAGE program. The OUTAGE program is h ighly in te rac t ive and requires no 
special operator t r a i n i n g . 
The important funct ion provided by the OUTAGE is simultaneous and mixed 
outages selection of system components. 
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OCEPS OUTAGE INPROGRESS R3.0.0 
GENERATOR BUS-—SUB ACTIVE POWER 
08/02/1985.01:27:17 
2 3 2 0.674 
1 1 1 0.638 
4 22 8 0.381 
5 36 11 0.378 
PLEASE ENTER : GEN.NO., CODE, CHANGE 
— CHANGE : IN % OR PU 
— CODE := 1 EXPECTED 
= 2 UNEXPECTED 
PRESS RETURN TO STOP 
2,2,.1PU 
OCEPS OUTAGE INPROGRESS R3.0.0 























TABLE (7.10) GENERATOR OUTAGES 
OCEPS OUTAGE IN PROGRESS R3.0.0 
LOAD-NO. BUS SUB ACTIVE-LOAD LOAD-NO. 
08/02/1985.02:10:43 
BUS SUB REACTIVE-LOAD 
4 9 5 0.272 8 20 8 0.227 
5 7 5 0.236 1 2 2 0.112 
8 20 8 0.222 7 16 7 0.091 
1 2 2 0.167 18 50 21 0.079 
6 7 5 0.166 4 9 5 0.061 
7 16 7 0.164 10 38 12 0.056 
18 50 21 0.123 5 7 5 0.053 
10 38 12 0.080 20 53 24 0.045 
23 72 30 0.072 14 46 17 0.042 
16 48 19 0.065 6 7 5 0.040 
14 46 17 0.064 2 4 3 0.026 
20 53 24 0.059 3 5 4 0.026 
3 5 4 0.056 16 48 19 0.024 
12 44 15 0.055 12 44 15 0.018 
9 32 10 0.043 9 32 10 0.017 
11 40 14 0.043 21 56 26 0.016 
13 45 16 0.024 13 45 16 0.014 
21 56 26 0.023 23 72 30 0.014 
15 47 18 0.023 11 40 14 0.012 
19 52 23 0.022 19 52 23 0.011 
2 4 3 0.018 22 67 29 0.007 
22 67 29 0.016 15 47 18 0.006 
17 49 20 0.016 17 49 20 0.006 
PLEASE ENTER THE LOAD CHANGES IN % OR PU 
PRESS RETURN TO STOP 
ENTER LOAD-NO., ACT-LOAD, REAC-LOAD 
TABLE (7.11) LOAD LIST 
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7.3.6 Security Assessement Output (SECOUT) 
The securi ty assessment ouptut program (SECOUT) provides AC solu t ion 
results as obtained from the securi ty assessment program (SECASS). I t has 
a summary l i s t which provides a quick re fe rence t o h i g h l i g h t those 
contingencies which caused voltage or overload v i o l a t i o n s . Consequently, 
the operator can select the appropriate contingency and study in de ta i l the 
results of securi ty assessment. 
I f the contingency resul t l i s t i s outdated, the program automatically 
sends an alarm to inform the operator. The operator can then request the 
most up to date l i s t . Tables (7.12) to (7.14) i l l u s t r a t e t yp i ca l SECOUT 
program contingency output r e su l t s . 
OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 08/02/1985.00:26:34 
SECURITY ASESSMENT SUMMARY THIS IS THE MOST RECENT LIST 
**TASK USESE COMBINED OVERLOAD AND VOLTAGE LIST** 
RANK LINE BUS SUB OVERLOAD UNDERVOLTAGE OVERVOLTAGE 
1 36 63-61 28-37 Y Y N 
2 7 6-14 4-6 N N N 
3 14 25-35 9-10 N N N 
4 12 10-34 6-10 N N N 
5 37 59-66 27-29 N N N 
6 33 53-55 24-25 N N N 
7 38 60-71 27-30 N N N 
8 20 40-42 14-15 N N N 
9 30 41-52 15-23 N N N 
10 32 52-54 23-24 N N N 
TABLE (7.12) SECURITY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
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OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
LINE FLOW REPORT FOR THE OUTAGE OF LINE 36 
LINE BUS SUB LIMIT LINE 
1 1- 3 1- 2 130.00 32.69 2 
3 2- 6 2- 4 65.00 13.82 4 
5 3- 9 2- 5 130.00 34.58 6 
7 6-14 4- 6 90.00 0.07 8 
9 12-16 6- 7 130.00 32.16 10 
11 11-25 6- 9 65.00 -2.70 12 
13 25-36 9-11 65.00 -47.78 14 
15 5-38 4-12 65.00 24.61 16 
17 37-40 12-14 32.00 6.64 18 
19 37-45 12-16 32.00 2.06 20 
21 45-46 16-17 16.00 -0.91 22 
23 47-48 18-19 16.00 -0.41 24 
25 33-49 10-20 32.00 9.72 26 
27 29-50 10-21 32.00 19.46 28 
29 50-51 21-22 32.00 5.64 30 
31 51-54 22-24 16.00 16.18 32 
33 53-55 24-25 16.00 13.31 34 
35 55-62 25-27 16.00 10.19 36 
37 59-66 27-29 16.00 4.67 38 
39 65-73 29-30 16.00 2.74 40 
41 15-63 6-28 32.00 -3.17 
08/02/1985 00:26:34 
** RANK 1 CONTINGENCY** 
BUS SUB LIMIT FLOW 
1-- 4 1-- 3 130.00 19.30 
4. - 5 3-- 4 130.00 17.18 
2--12 2-- 6 100.00 13.71 
7--16 5. - 7 70.00 -13.68 
13--18 6' - 8 32.00 -20.25 
10--34 6 -10 32.00 7.92 
25> -35 9> -10 65.00 45.09 
38 -39 12 -13 65.00 -7.59 
37. -44 12--15 32.00 14.35 
40--42 14. -15 16.00 1.57 
43 • -47 15--18 16.00 2.23 
48 -49 19 -20 32.00 -7.86 
26^  -46 10. -17 32.00 8.07 
30 -51 10 -22 32.00 10.63 
41 -52 15. -23 16.00 6.87 
52 -54 23 -24 16.00 4.21 
55 -56 25 -26 16.00 2.70 
63 -61 28 -27 65.00 0.00 
60 -71 27 -30 16.00 5.31 
24 -63 8 -23 32.00 3.12 
TABLE (7.13) SECURITY ASSESSMENT LINE FLOW REPORT FOR 
OUISGE OF BRANCH 36 
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OCEPS AUTOMATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENTS RESULTS 
VOLTAGE REPORT FOR THE OUTAGE OF LINE 36 
BUS SUB HIGH 1 .OW VOLTAGE BUS 
1 1 1.100 0.900 1.061 2 
4 3 1.100 0.900 1.934 5 
7 5 1.100 0.900 1.012 10 
16 7 1.100 0.900 1.011 17 
25 9 1.100 0.900 1.023 26 
36 11 1.100 0.900 1.080 37 
39 13 1.100 0.900 1.070 40 
41 15 1.100 0.900 1.002 45 
46 17 1.100 0.900 0.997 47 
48 19 1.100 0.900 0.987 49 
50 21 1.100 0.900 0.984 51 
52 23 1.100 0.900 0.979 53 
55 25 1.100 0.900 0.909 56 
57 27 1.100 0.900 0.889 63 
64 29 1.100 0.900 0.871 69 
08/02/1985 00:26:34 
** RANK 1 CONTINGENCY** 
SUB HIGH LOW VOLTAGE 
2 1.100 0.900 1.047 
4 1.100 0.900 1.028 
6 1.100 0.900 1.021 
8 1.100 0.900 1.011 
10 1.100 0.900 0.998 
12 1.100 0.900 1.027 
41 1.100 0.900 1.010 
16 1.100 0.900 1.009 
18 1.100 0.900 0.991 
20 1.100 0.900 0.989 
22 1.100 0.900 0.983 
24 1.100 0.900 0.955 
26 1.100 0.900 0.894 
28 1.100 0.900 1.020 
30 1.100 0.900 0.862 
TABLE (7.14) SECURITY ASSESSMENT VOLTAGE REPORT FOR THE 
OUTAGE OF BRANCH 36 
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7.3.7 Integrat ion of Security Assessment Package to OCEPS 
OCEPS' contingency analysis solut ion approach i s divided in to two 
major processes. Contingency screening (AUTOUT program), and f u l l AC 
contingency processing (SECASS program). 
As an aid to the network control engineer, i t i s possible to assess 
the e f f e c t of any scheduled or unexpected branch outages by means of a f a s t 
approximate load f low method. Contingency screening i s the f i r s t stage of 
the a n a l y s i s . This module p r e d i c t s the number and s e v e r i t y of any 
overloads or abnormal voltages which may resu l t from the switching 
operation or breaker status change under considerat ion. I t ranks the 
harmful contingencies by assigning p r i o r i t y orders. Those wi th the lower 
rank order are more l i k e l y to cause v io la t ions than those wi th higher rank 
order. 
Screening i s a quick way to determine which contingencies are 
d e f i n i t e l y harmless. At present, the l i s t of f i r s t ten contingencies w i l l 
be processed by f u l l AC s o l u t i o n . 
The second stage, secur i ty assessment, examines those contingencies 
t ransfer red f o r f u l l AC so lu t i on . The secur i ty assessment phase, hence, 
proceeds to analyse the i n t ac t system and the preselected outage cases. 
The securi ty assessment program is based on f a s t decoupled Newton-Raphson 
and f o r outages simulation i t applies Diakoptics as discussed in previous 
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chapters. This program runs automatical ly based on a p re -spec i f i ed 
execution cycle . 
I f the network topology changes, the security assessment program will 
be paused until the new contingency l i s t i s evaluated by the screening 
program. 
I f the network configuration changes and the intact networt sp l i t into 
two, the program assigns automatical ly a reference bus in subnetwork 
without the original reference bus. The screening process is also capable 
of selecting contingency l i s t s under such circumstances. 
The new technique developed by the author for network islanding is 
incorporated in the OCEPS security analysis package. If as a result of a 
branch outage the network sp l i ts into two, then by the application of the 
new technique the security assessment provides ful l AC solution for both 
subnetworks in para l le l . 
Figures ( 7 . 7 ) through ( 7 . 9 ) i l lus t ra te OCEPS coordination of 
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FIGURE ( 7 . 3 ) OVERALL OCEPS SECURITY ASSESSMENT PACKAGE 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEACH 
8.1 Conclusions 
In this work consideration has been given to the Real-Time Electr ical 
Power Network Security Assessment which is a prerequisite of any on-line 
control and monitoring scheme and which in i t s e l f gives a significant saving 
of operational cost by providing an indicat ion of system secur i ty and 
information about the power system response after equipment outages have 
been introduced. 
D ig i ta l computers are used widely in modern power systems in order to 
carry out Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Automatic 
Generation Control (AGC). The SCADA function provides a basis for the 
monitoring and control. Montioring of l imit values, trends and simple means 
for post-disturbance analysis such as sequence of event recording/replay 
action and post mortem review are a few examples of the SCADA function. 
Beyond the SCADA category, a lot of functions deal with system security. 
The security of a power system is generally judged in terms of the 
system's abi l i ty to withstand the impact of sudden changes due to the loss 
of transmission l ines , transformers, generators, loads and compensators. 
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Histor ical ly , the load flow is used as a simulation tool when analysing 
system security. For steady state security assessment of the existing and 
future system, a general purpose load flow solution method based on the Fast 
Decoupled Newton Raphson was presented in Chapter 4. The program 
development takes f u l l advantage of spars i ty techniques and simulates 
automatic tap changers and phase sh i f ters . 
The conventional method for simulation of branch outages is based on 
load flow techniques and requires the refactorisation of system admittance 
matrices for individual branch outage cases. This method is ineff icient for 
operational purposes in Real-Time environment. 
The solution to a l inear or non-linear network can be obtained from the 
inverse of the system admittance matrix. Theory of network changes has been 
studied in Chapters 3 and 4. As demonstrated in these chapters, the new 
solution to a network subjected to topological changes, can be obtained from 
the original solution in an eff icient and organised manner via the 
application of Diakoptic techniques. This theory was further developed to 
simulate simultaneous branch outages. The technique proved to be eff icient 
(up to 3 simultaneous outages) and most suitable for the Real-Time 
applications and was successfully applied to the OCEPS security assessment 
package. 
The conventional techniques for assessment of transmission networks 
secur i ty normally assume that the network to be studied w i l l only be 
1 
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subjected to a relat ively small number of contingencies simultaneously and 
furthermore that those contingencies w i l l not s p l i t the network into 
islands. Should such a situation a r ise , the approach is usually to restr ic t 
analysis to the largest island so created. 
The above approach has serious disadvantages in power systems for which 
islanding is common occurrence. In Chapter 6 a unique approach for the 
Diakoptic solution of the network flow when subjected to configuration 
changes was presented. The algorithm proved to be accurate and ef f ic ient 
and most suitable for the online security assessment of power systems. 
The above technique was successfully implemented in the OCEPS security 
assessment subsystem and based on the results obtained, a technical paper 
was published in the IEE second international conference on power system 
monitoring and control at Durham 1985. 
The common procedure for the security check is to evaluate meaningful 
contingency cases. If the potential outage results in limit violat ions, 
then the system is said to be vulnerable. This system state should be 
reliably detected for possible corrective rescheduling actions. 
In an on-line environment, the computational burden that the above 
task imposes, does not allow the simulation of a l l conceivable 
contingencies. Therefore, security analysis must be restricted to 
presumable c r i t i c a l cases defined in a contingency l i s t . 
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In order to reduce the number of contingencies that need to be 
evaluated when assessing the power system's security in a Real-time 
environment, an Automatic Contigency Selection (ACS) algorithm based on the 
fast DC power flow was presented in Chpater 5. 
The ACS as implemented in the OCEPS sui te , provides the voltage and 
overload contingency l i s t s when network i s subjected to configuration 
changes (mult i - islands). In OCEPS implementation, the ACS is executed 
automatically according to a pre-selected time step. This package is also 
event driven and as a result of a configuration change i t is automatically 
triggered to execute. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, once the ACS results are available, those 
above a certain threshold are passed for a detailed network flow analysis 
which is also executed automatically. The contingency l i s t provided by the 
ACS can be edited via an interactive program developed and integrated into 
OCEPS. 
The program allows selection of mixed equipment outages and via system 
messages to the security assessment package, provides AC solutions for 
further investigation. 
The general concept of the organisation and the integration of the 
network security assessment software package to the OCEPS suite has been 
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described in Chapter 7. A useful degree of f l ex ib i l i t y has been achieved by 
adopting a modular structure of the package in which the programs 
communicate with others via task common blocks. 
With the development of e lectr ical power industry and the 
interconnection of isolated power systems, very large power systems are 
formed. The expansion of the system brings not only the great economical 
and technical rationality into the system, but also the complexity into the 
analysis and the computational simulations of the system. The complexity i s 
a great challenge to the s ta t ic and dynamical analysis and computationally 
impossible in terms of Real-Time monitoring and control of large scale power 
systems. 
One way to solve the above problem is by using network equivalent 
techniques. Conventional techniques developed to perform electr ica l network 
reduction have been studied in Chapter 5. A new approach for obtaining 
network equivalents in an off - l ine environment has been presented in Chapter 
6. 
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8.2 Suggestions for further research work 
The following topics related to the Real-Time security analysis 
discussed in this thesis require further investigation: 
1 - The theory of network islanding could be further developed to 
cater for cases when simultaneous outages of branches cause a 
sp l i t or multiple is lands. 
2 - The ACS algorithm could be further developed to include 
appropriate ranking of loads and generators in the system. 
3 - Inclusion of bus and station outages in the security package. 
4 - Simulation of c i rcu i t break outages. 
5 - Detection and provision of appropriate alarms i f bus sp l i t occurs 
as a result of switching. 
6 Development of one line diagrams (graphics) in order to select 
contingencies via the one l ine diagram and also graphical 
representation of the security assessment resul ts . 
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7 - Development of security assessment algorithms to include the 
dynamic/algebraic equations of system components in order to 
provide dynamic response of the system when subjected to 
equipment outages. With the advance in computer technology such 
algorithms could soon be implemented in Real-time environments. 
Such approaches wil l be most valuable in systems where islanding 
is common place. 
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TRANSMISSION NETWORK SECURITY ANALYSIS INCORPORATING NETWORK ISLANDING 
A R Shaf1e-Pour, M J H Sterling and M R Irving 
University of Durham, UK 
ABSTRACT 
Conventional techniques tor assessment of transmission 
network security normally assume that the network to be 
studied will only be subject to a relatively small 
number of contingencies and furthermore that those 
contingencies will not spilt the network Into Islands. 
Should such a situation arise the approach Is usually to 
restrict analysis to the largest Island created. This 
approach has serious disadvantages In power systems 
which are subjected to frequent major outages and for 
which Islanding Is a common occurrence. 
This paper presents a new technique' for the dlakoptlc 
solution of the network flow when subjected to 
configuration changes. The. technique Is shown to be 
applicable to - the. - automatic selection of system 
contingencies and the subsequent a.c. security 
assessment for these contingencies. In the dlakoptlcal 
method the solution for the Individual Islands Is found 
using the sparse factors of the Intact network matrices 
by means of additional forward and backward s u b -
stitutions and since It avoids the need to reformulate 
and tactorlse the network matrices It Is most suitable 
for reai-Ume security assessment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Security assessment analysis has evolved from load-flow 
techniques and provides a measure of system performance 
following the occurrence of any of a pre-speclfled set 
of contingencies. The selection process Is normally 
Implemented by an automatic contingency selection 
algorithm (ACS) commonly based on d.c. loadflow (1.2). 
The ACS ranks the outages In order of decreasing 
severity and those above a certain threshold, which will 
not spilt the network Into Islands, are passed for a 
detailed network flow analysis. The conventional method 
for simulation of branch outages which cause a spilt 
network Is based on the Introduction of a new slack 
busbar and redistribution of active power among the 
specified generators In each subsystem formed and 
Anally refactorlsatlon of [B'l and IB"! matrices taking 
Into account the existence of a second reference and the 
branch outaged. 
The present paper describes a new algorithm tor the 
dlakoptic solution of the network flow when a spilt 
network occurs as a result of a branch outage. The new 
technique avoids the need to reorder and refactorlse 
IB') and IB"] matrices. It has been tested using a 
range of networks and compared with an alternative 
approach In which the network Islands are formulated and 
solved as separate load flow problems. From the 
numerical results obtained It can be seen that the new 
technique has advantages for application In reel time 
security assessment 
SUMMARY OF BASIC ALGORITHM FOR OUTAGE STUDIES 
Tne application of dlakoptics to linear and non-linear 
networks Is summarised. 
Assuming that V Q Is known from the solution of the 
original linear equation 
0 0 o ( 1 ) 
where Y Q represents the original admittance matrix. The 
new value V n 0 w alter one branch has been completed can 
be obtained from 
new o o 
where 
(Ml = row vector which is null except for l i > +1 and 
M j » - l 1 
X • Z M Is the difference of columns I and J o * 
0 , 2 o 
• Y _ _ 1 stored In factored form o 




C - (1 /b • M S O - 1 a scalar factor 
b • line or nominal transformer aeries 
admittance. 
The above approach Is fast, accurate and avoids 
refactorlslng Y . 
Load flow Is well known as a non-linear problem. The 
test decoupled Newton-Raphson (FDNR) loadllow has proved 
fast, sufficiently accurate and reliable [31. n is 
already well documented and therefore no detailed 
description will be presented. The basic model is 
described by: 
(A«) • I B 1 ] " 1 I A P / V 1 
fAVl - I B - f 1 IAQ/V) 
( 3 ) 
(4) 






can be applied to 
in order to obtain 
Step 1: - I B ' l " 1 I A P / V 1 
Step 2 : X' - I B * f N M 
Step 3: i / c - - w • M V 
Step 4: , A S n e w ' - fA* 1 - C ' X ' M ' A S . 0 0 
where b' - 1 / X | k 
<5) 
For voltages, similar steps to those above can be 
Implemented and the new voltages are: 
| A V N E W ) - A V ° - C ' X - M ' A V 0 ( 6 ) 
where 
42 
PRE-PROCESSING FOR SYSTEM SEPARATION 
Consider Fig ( la) which represents two Islands Inter 
connected by the tle-llne between buses I end ]. The 
Thevenin equivalent circuit lor the above Is' shown in 
Fig ( lb) . 
in Fig ( lb) . Z ( and Z b are the equivalent Impedances of the two 




Z a V l 2. V z i ( v , (7) 
tub-matrix ( 2 ^ ] is me Impedance matrix 01 tne 
connected part and (Z 4 ° ) should be modified to obtain 
the Impedance ol the second Island. In this work. Y Q is 
assumed symmetrical and since the row elements in suD-
matrlx IB) have equal eo-tactors. the row elements in 
' [ Z 2 ° ] are equal. 
It l v Ig. .. I m represent the injections at the buses 
ol the Intact network, the' original solution Is given 
by: 
V - Z I o o o 
or: 
if now tne tie-line between buses I and J is to be 
removed, from equation ( 2 ) we have: 




Step 2 : 1 / C » ( l / b * MSO 
(- l /y ( j • 1/y,,) 
Therefore 
1 / C - 0 
¥ l
 mWi2W3* - • 4 V | * V i / ' " ^irn'm 
where column J. k ... m are referred to as the. buses in 
the second island. 
When the' tie-line Is removed, the solution to tne 
connected part can be obtained from: 
new o 
V l " v l " Y ' u ' k " ' i m ' r n 
» 2 n e W - v 2 ° - « 2 ) l f z 2 k l k ^ 2 m . m 
Hence a split network results when 1 / C - 0 . Without 
lurther calculation and by Inspection of 'X' obtained 




t— island 1 (with the original slack) 
island 2 
wnen diakoptics is applied to FONR. following the steps 
above 1 / C . becomes very small but not Identically le ro 
and furtner. vector 'X' would not hold absolute zeros. 
• A sensitivity factor should therelore be specified which 
is a function of the computer on which the study is 
implemented. 
new o 
*l " y l - V f V . — ^ i V m 
(8) 
A column in | Z 2 ° ] can be chosen, corresponding to the 
new reference busbar and hence equation (8) can be 
presented as: 
now o 
* 2 - * 2 S r V 
ISLANDING 
By removing the branch between. buses i and j In Fig ( 1 ) . . 
the original network divides Into two islands. The 
original admittance and Impedance matrices are in the 
following form 
V . Z . 
I 
1 1 i • 
C | . 
: H * -




Z 2 ° 
v . n e W " V . ° - I . r V ' l i * - V 
In matrix form the above can be represented as: 
i v n e w i - cvoi - c / aoi c 2 ' i 0 
| v n e w ) gives the solution to the connected part, 
where: IV 1 « H Ml 1 
O 0 0 




C , ' it lero everywhere but * r for the new reference 
Duiotr. Hence C.'aV l i • column vector corresponding to 
i o 
me new reference busbar. C ? ! Is w o tor Island 1 and 
' V tor island 2. It Is set when calculating (X] as In 
the previous section. C j ' ts • scalar factor. H 
in ine subsystem without the original reference bus. 
mere Is no provision for tne Introduction of a new 
slack bus. then the reference Is taken as the busbar of 
the new subsystem connected to the outaged branch. 
The advantage of applying equation (9) to obtain the new 
solution for the connected network Is that It avoids 
refactoriting 
To obtain the solution to the subsystem without the 
original reference in parallel with the solution of the 
connected part, the following equation can be applied: 
where 
(10) 
l " - f U y Zy V 
ro is the shunt admittance 
connected to the 
reference bus 
original 
Z 3 " , < V r l r , / c 2 V 
* S * r l r l 
iQ refers to the original reference bus and r , refers to 
me new reference bus. The above can be applied 
directly to automatic contingency selection algorithms 
which are based on dc loadflow. 
APPLICATION TO AC LOAD FLOW 
When a split network arises as e consequence of a branch 
outage, conventionally a new reference busbar Is chosen 
in the Island which Is not connected to the original 
system. This busbar can be Introduced es an Input by 
the operator or automatically chosen, as the busber which 
had the biggest active generation prior to the outage. 
N must be among the generators specified for 
redistribution of active power. The draw back of such 
approaches is the need to Introduce the existence of the 
second reference and the outagad branch In IB') and 
IB'). It is consequently proposed that the new 
reference is chosen automatically, but as explained In 
the previous section, its existence Is not reflected In 
IB'l and IB'] . Hence, there Is no need to retactorlse. 
The new technique was applied to FDNR according to the 
flow diagram shown In Fig (2). Since PV buses are not 
Included in IB') , no modification Is required to be 
performed after voltages are obtained In each Iteration. 
NO o r i 
ITERATIONS 
COMPACTING' SOLUTION TOTAL 
ORDERING TIM1 • TIME 
fACTORISINO T l IMC) T l M C I 
T I M I f CI ! 
ISLAND 1 
wl l l l or ig inal 
• M e * 
4 
i 
0 . M 1 t i n I o ioi 
ISLAND | t O . t M 0 4 » 1 I N 
OMKOPTK 
TCCHNIOUI 
t o . n i o . n i 
TABLE 111 - R M I I I W U l M On PE RUIN -ELMER S I M 
T l and T t ara a t • * » « • M H a O l 
GENERATION 
BUS NUMBER 









1 Naw Slack 
1 1 




111.10 t l t . t t 
00.00 00.00 
M . M M . l l 
-1S.00 - 1 1 IT 
T t . 1 1 T i l l 
I T U M . M . ' 
S.4T 1 4 4 
N . U f t - B I 
TABLE tt> - Compan ion t l m u l l s 
CONCLUSION 
When a split network arises es a consequence of a single 
branch outage, the above technique based on tne 
dlakopilcal solution of network flows has been shown to 
be efficient, accurate, fast and most suitable for tne 
real time* security assessment of electrical power 
networks. It avoids the need to refactorise (B'l and 
IB") and furthermore, modifications to angles are onry 
required after each Iteration. If automatic tap changers 
ere Included In the system, the tap positions on the 
Island with no reference should be set to the Initial 
tap positions, before any modifications are performed. 
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The new technique has been applied to many linear and 
non-linear networks and shown to be accurate and 
reliable. In Fig 13) If the tie-line between bus 2 and 
bus 6 is removed, the Intact network divides Into two 
Islands. Tne new technique has been applied to obtain 
the network solutions for both Islands in parallel and 
compared witn those obtained using two separate 
loaonows The results are given in Table (1). It 
should be noted that the times shown for tne 
.onventionai approach eiciude the required time (or data 
input. The loadtlow results are compared In Table (2). 
Table(3)and t a b l e ( 4 ) i l l u s t r a t e the t e s t data network. 
44 
4 
(a) - Network interconnection 
<b) - Equivalent Circuit 
1NPU1 DATA 
IWIIIAUSC; v • i « • o 
1 
FACTORISE B'. B ' 
I 
INPUT DATA FOR OUTAGES 
COMPUTE CORRECTIONS FOR 
MISMATCH EQUATIONS 
rmo A P/» 
FOR PV AND PO BUSES 
SOLVE 
IB ) • IB'IIAP/VI 
FOR PV AWO PQ BUSES 
MOOiFt 
—H USING EQUATION I I011 
SOLVE 
V • IB'IIAOSVI 
FOR PO BUSES 
IV > V « « V 
X 
H CHECK FOR CONVERGENCE I 
Icowvenogp" I 
I OUTPUT RESULTS | 
ire CI) - Network interconnection Figure (2) - Flow diagram lor the Implementation 
Islanding In FDNR. 
Lj 
LINE DESIGNATION • P V » p» SUSC p» 
1 2 0 01B2 0OS7S 0 0000 
I S 0.0452 0.1552 0 0204 
f ' 4 0 0570 o . i r i r 0 0154 
I 4 0.0132 0 01T5 0 0042 
2 * 0.0SS1 0 1751 0 0167 
t 004SO 0.1150 0 0102 
S » 0.020? 0.0520 0 0005 
* I 0.0120 0.0420 0 0000 0 t 0.0000 0.2050 00000 
• 10 0.0000 0.5560 0 0006 • 11 0.0000 0.2060 0 0000 • 10 0.0000 0.1100 0 0000 4 12 0.0000 0.2)50 0 0000 
17 12 0.0000 0.1400 0 0000 
12 14 0.1251 0.2SS5 0 0000 
12 IS 0.0552 0.1104 0 0000 
12 1 * 0.0545 0.166T 0 0000 
14 IS 0.2210 0 1557 0 0006 
IS 10 0.1070 6.216) 0 0000 
11 I f 0.00S6 0 .11 f t 0 0000 
I f 20 0.0140 0.0660 ooooo 
10 IT 0.0524 0.064) 0 0000 
!• 21 0.0145 0.074t ooooo 10 22 0.0T2T 6.1466 ooooo 
21 22 0.0115 6.0216 ' ooooo 
IS 23 0 1000 0.2020 o o o o o 
22 24 0.1150 61760 ooooo 
24 25 0.1505 M i l ooooo 
25 26 0.2544 0 1100 . ooooo 
2 t 27 0 1005 0.2067. ooooo 
2S . n 0 0000 0 2666 ooooo 
2» tt 0.2195 - 0 4151 ooooo 
27 so 0 1 2 0 ! " 0 5027 0 0000 
2 * so 0.2100 0 4 ) 1 1 0 0000 
• 2 t 0.0550 0.2000 0 0214 « 2 t O O l S t 0.0)06 0 006) 
10 10 0.0000 -5.200 ooooo 
24 24 0.0000 - 2 5 00 ooooo 
re (3) - Te»t Network TABLE (3) - Impedance and line charging data. 
BUS NuMBE* VOLlAGE ipui OENEMTIOH LOAD 
MW MVAR MW MVAR 
i 1 M O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
J 1 04SO 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 TO 1 1 TO 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' • 0 0 0 T 6 0 1 0 0 
5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 . • 4 . 2 0 1 ( 0 0 
« 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 
t i . o i oo 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 J O 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 
1 1 i oa?o 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 1 ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 . 2 0 r .so 
1 3 1 0 7 1 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 ooooo 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 0 
I S ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 2 0 2 SO 
I t 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 a. so 1 . 0 0 
IT ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 • 0 0 S . 0 0 
11 0 . 0 0 0 0 M O O 0 0 . 0 0 3 . 2 0 o . w 
I f ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 9-SO . 9 4 0 
t o ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 w o o 2 . 2 4 • TO 
2 1 ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 I T SO 1 1 . 2 0 
2 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 . 2 0 1 6 0 
1 4 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 • TO • TO 
2 S ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 0 ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 • so 2 . 3 0 
2 T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 ooooo 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 o t o 
M • 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 » 





The Appendix i s devoted to a few numerical examples and deals wi th: 
A2.1 appl icat ion of the recurs ive method to l i n e a r networks 
A2.2 s p l i t network 
A2.3 node merge 
A2.4 appl icat ion of the d i r e c t method to l i n e a r networks. 
A2.1 Applicat ion of the recurs ive method to l i n e a r network 
Consider the network shown below, where the in jected real currents are 
shown at each node and the real part of the admittance i s a lso given: 
1 
1 
Figure (a) - Simple real l i n e a r network 
For the above network the or ig ina l impedance matrix Z Q can be shown a s : 
5 2 1 
2 4 2 
1 2 5 
and the or ig ina l voltages as v Q . 
5 2 1 
V o = Z o ] o = 8 2 4 2 






Now suppose that network of Figure (a) i s subjected to three simultaneous 
branch outages as fo l lows: 
1) remove the branch between node 1 and the reference (node zero) 
2) then add a branch between node 1 and node 3 
3) then remove the branch between node 3 and the reference (node zero) 
Hence the connection matrix and the modified branch impedance for each of 
the above fau l ts would be: 
( i ) for the f i r s t f a u l t C, 1 
f l = " 1 
( i i ) for the second f a u l t 
f 2 = +1 
( i i i ) for the t h i r d f a u l t 
1 
V - 1 
see Figure ( b ) . 
We want to f ind the new voltages a f t e r each f a u l t . 
Fault number 1 - the procedure i s as fo l lows: 1. 
a) Find Z c , i . e . d i f fe ren t of column 1 and zero of Zn -o l o 
To simulate column zero of Z Q we add a row and a column to 
1Q with a l l elements set to zero , i . e . 
column 1 
5/8 2/8 1/8 
2/8 4/8 2/8 
Z o = 1/8 2/8 5/8 
. . • . . J 
0 
. - I 
' 0 
column zero 
X l s Z o C l = 8 5 0 5 
2 0 1 2 
1 0 " 8 1 
) i 
1 0 ! 
i t L l i 






element zero 0 
. . X t = 5/8 - 0 = 5/8 
c ) Find = ( f j + X j ) ' 1 
d,_ = (-1 + 5 / 8 ) " 1 = -8 /3 
d) Find C j * V Q , i . e . d i f ference of element 1 and zero of V Q -
To simulate element zero of V Q add a row to V Q set to zero: 




element zero ! 0 I 
. . VQ = 3/2 - 0 = 3/2 
e) Find b 1 = d 1 VQ 
b1 = ( - 8 /3 ) (3 /2 ) = -4 
f ) Hence 








_o_ . j Q ! 
Fault number 2 
( -4) = 
3 
I o ! 
W = Z C 0 = d i f ference of column 1 and 3 of l n 






5/8 1/8 4/8 
2/8 2/8 0 
1/8 5/8 -4 /8 
r • 
i 0 > 0 ! ' 0 
Find a = d x W 
where W i s the d i f ference of elements 1 and zero of W 
C j 1 W = 4/8 
a = ( - 8 / 3 ) (4 /8 ) = -4 /3 
Find W = W - X 1 a 
x 2 = W = 
4/8 5/8 
0 2/8 
-4 /8 1/8 
I 1 1 
! o 1 
1 
0 l 
( -4 /3 ) = 
Find d 2 = ( f 2 X g ) " 1 
X 2 = d i f ference of element 1 and 3 of X 2 
X 2 = 4/3 + 1/3 = 5/3 
d 2 = (1 + 5 / 3 ) " 1 = 3/8 
Find b = d 2 C 2 V x 
C 2 r Vj = d i f ference of element 1 and 3 of 
C 2 V x = 4 - 3 = 1 












r i . . 
! o ; ; o ; 
(3 /8 ) = 
Fault number 3 









: 0 : 
I I 
Find a = d 1 C y W 
W = 1/8 
a = ( - 8 / 3 ) ( l / 8 ) = -1 /3 




0 0 : 




1 0 ! 
' 1 
d) Find a = d 2 CyW 
C^W = 1/3 - 2/3 = -1 /3 








0 o ! 
• 
Find d, = ( f 3 + C 3 t X 3 ) _ 1 
C y X 3 = 5/8 
d 3 = (-1 + 5/8)_ 1 = -8/3 
Find b = d 3 V 2 
V 2 = 25/8 
b = ( -8 /3J25 /8 ) = -25/3 




















Figure (bl) After f i r s t fault 
3/8 24/8 8/8 








r , r r r 
Figure (b3) Afer the 3rd fault 
Figure (b) Network Changes 
A2.2 Spl i t Network 
I t was explained previously that i f 1/d = 0, i t indicates a sp l i t 
network. To show this i s true consider the following network: 
l l i 2 : 3 
1 
figure (c) 
If now the branch between nodes 1 and 2 be removed (which causes sp l i t ) 
we investigate what happens to d. 
For the above network: 
1 1 1 





1/d = f + C* X 
1/d = f + C* ZQ C 
1/d = f + + X22 " X^2 " ^21 
1/d - - 1 + 1 ^ 2 - 1 - 1 - 0 
A2.3 Node Merge 
Consider Figure (a) for which Z Q and VQ are as in (1) and (2) . If a 
short c i rcu i t occurs betweens nodes 2 and 3, then the network reduces to 
that of Figure (d). 
1 L- 1 i 5 
1 i 
1 f t * * * * • * * * * AS 
1 
Figure (d) Node Merge 
For the above network i t can be shown that: 
Xm = 1/5 
and Vm -




the original network, i . e . Figure (a ) , by setting f=0 as follows: 
+1 
X = Z Q C = 1/8 
CTV° = - 1/2 
C 1 X = 5/8 
d = (f + C T X ) _ 1 = (0 + 5 /8)" 1 = 8/5 










as obtained previously. As can be seen, voltages 
at nodes 2 and 3 are given as equal amounts. 
A2.4 Application of the direct method to l inear networks 
The following formula holds in general: 
(A + XUY)' 1 = A" 1 X (U" 1 + Y A" 1 X ) " 1 Y A" 1 (Al) 
This formulate can be considered as a method for building in the 
inverse of (A + X U Y) from the inverse of A. 
In applications to networks equation (Al) i s applied in the following 
form: 
New Z = Z - Z C (f + C* ln C ) ' 1 C* ln (A2) 
0 O x O ' 0 * ' 
where 
Z Q = impedance matrix of the orignal network 
f = diagonal m by m matrix of impedances of the 
m branches added to the network (of -ve sign 
i f the branch removed). 
C = connection matrix (mxn) of elements +1 or -1 or zero. 
A numerical example is solved to i l lus t ra te the application of the 
equation (A2) to l inear networks. It can also be applied to non-linear 
problems. 
I f the current injections at each node is known, then the new voltages 
would be obtained from the original voltages: 
newV = VQ - Z Q C (f + C* 1Q C ) " 1 C* VQ 
Hence, the procedure is as follows: 
1) X = XQ C 
2) L = C t X 
3) d = (f + L ) " 1 
4) M - C* V 0 
5) b = d.M 
6) V = V - X.b ' m o 
When the outaged branch is a shunt element, there is no need to add rows and 
columns to X and ZQ and VQ having elements of zero as shown below. This is 
done only for computer programming purposes. 
1 
i 





• — - —I 
Nk 
i i 
• • 0 1 
So j o o ; 
1 
1 n 1 





Nk is the number of nodes. 
Equation (c) i s basically that used for simultaneous branch outages dealt 
with already, but with minor changes. C is the matrix of outage 
representations, f i s a diagonal matrix. 
As an example consider Figure (c) and suppose i t is subjected to 2 
simultaneous branch additions, between nodes 2 and 3, each branch of 
admittance = 1. The original Z Q was shown in section B2 as: 
Xo = 







The new impedance matrix Z m can be shown to be: 
1 1 1 
1 2 2 (4) 
1 2 7/3 
Thus Z can be obtained from: m 
X = Z - Z C (f + C* Z„ C ) " 1 Ct I m o o o ' o 













i) z 0 c = 






3) (f + C* 1 C ) " 1 = 2/3 -1/3 
-1/3 2/3 
4) C ' 2 0 = 0 0 -1 
0 0 -1 
5) (f + C* Z Q C ) " 1 C* Z Q 0 0 -1/3 
0 0 -1/3 
6) ZQ C (f + C* Z Q C ) _ 1 C* Z Q = 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 2/3 
7) From equation 5: 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 2 2 - 0 0 0 
1 2 3 0 0 2/3 
1 1 1 
1 2 2 
1 2 7/3 
which is as that shown in (4) ear l ie r . 
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